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EDITORIAL COMMENT

We once again welcome you to an intellectually rich parked thirty seventh (37th) volume of ZANGO – Zambia Journal of Contemporary Issues. As one Ghanaian saying reminds us that 'A single bracelet does not jingle' this edition of ZANGO contains exciting scholarly articles based on well researched topics drawn from studies done in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. The articles in the current volume have produced a well-mixed academic jingle that provides a soothing scholarly sound to thirsty minds of readers.

Tafadi, Dunmoye and Nasidi in the first article for instance, identify and interrogate the conceptual issues surrounding the philosophy of democratic control of the military in new democracies from a liberal-pluralist perspective. Based on their well-researched topic from a political science and history point of view, the trio concluded that the trajectory of the democratic control of the military in Africa, Asia, and Latin America depends on inconsistencies in Western influences on the domestic political environments of states.

In the second article, Manchishi and Banja conducted a detailed and systematic desk research on the perennial challenge of improving initial teacher education in Zambia. Firstly, the duo proposed an expansion of the teacher education coursework to include action research, African knowledge systems and intercultural education. Secondly, they propose a versatile practicum for initial teacher education by attaching student teachers to schools right from their first year of study as a way of helping them to combine theory and practice. Producing quality teachers is key to having quality education in a nation as it has been demonstrated by countries around the globe that have achieved quality in their education system. Henry Adams cleverly puts it that 'Teachers affect eternity, they can never tell where their influence stops'.

Teachers touch the future that they teach including the future (today) of scholars such as Mumbengegwi, Mapara and Kabote who have in the third article of this edition provided a conceptual study in which they sought to advance the festival theory development, by offering insights on festival coloniality deterrents and potential opportunities that may accrue from the decolonisation of the African festivalscape. The three scholars concluded that the lagging behind of the African sphere in festival development may be attributed to a misunderstanding of the 'African festival' construct, which is a symptomatic residue of colonial hangover observed through systems that still personify former colonisers.

The jingle sound of the bracelets made by articles from the four African countries in this edition of the ZANGO arm is made more interesting by Mwenzwa as he, in the fourth article analysed the nexus between conflict, livelihood and vulnerability, and the place of social work in the nomadic children of Kenya. In this powerfully crafted study, Mwenzwa concluded that conflict and nomadic pastoralism combine to expose nomadic children to numerous adversities thus recommending

social work intervention so as to moderate nomadic children's vulnerability and augmenting their welfare.

Climate change is one of the most serious global concerns of the 21st Century and has long-term implications for all countries' sustainable development. It has greatly affected global policies about the environment and to a greater extent, the social and economic global landscape. However, competencies on how to sustainably live with the environment and climate change are not well acquired and utilised in most parts of the world, especially in developing countries. In the final article Wadson, Mulenga and Milupi examined learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices towards learning Climate Change Education (CCE) content in senior secondary schools in Malawi. In this mixed method study, findings revealed that learners' competencies on the subject of climate change were very rudimentary since the curriculum content that they learnt did not have sufficient coverage of the subject matter in question. The trio recommend an urgent curriculum review in Malawi so as to include aspects on Climate Change Education in the schools' subject matter.

Given the academic depth and richness that is in the articles of this edition, we strongly believe that you will greatly benefit from reading them. I would like to thank and appreciate the ZANGO editorial team for the hard work of ensuring the publication of this volume of the journal. Thank you also to all the authors for tirelessly working on the reviewer's recommendations and patiently waiting for the articles to be published. A profound word of gratitude goes to our generous and professionally tuned reviewers who put in their best and provided scholarly critique and guidance to the authors.

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Chief Editor

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THE PROCESSES, STRUCTURES AND ACTORS IN THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

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Abstract

This article identifies and interrogates the conceptual issues surrounding the philosophy of democratic control of the military in new democracies from a liberal-pluralist perspective. Such control aims at curbing the military's power and aligning it with civilian-crafted defence policies. It is observed that the dominant paradigm neglects the role of societal and external forces in the process of democratic control. Prominence is largely given to governmental institutions notably; the executive, legislature, and to some extent, the civil society. The article employs the comparative, historical, institutional, and structural tools of reconceptualising the theory and practice of civilian control of the military in new democracies. It is argued that democratic control of the military is a multifaceted process involving many actors. These cover legitimated state organs including military leaders, societal or domestic non-governmental forces, and international actors. They exercise respective functions in institutionalising democratic control. The article notes that the trajectory of the democratic control of the military in Africa, Asia, and Latin America depends on inconsistencies in Western influences on the domestic political environments of such states.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control, Military, New Democracies

Introduction

The term 'civil-military relations' is a broad concept that covers the basis, trends, implications and outcomes of the power relations arising from the dynamic and complex set of interactions existing between the military institution and the economic, political, and social realms of the national, as well as international environments in which it operates. A major subject of study in civil-military relations is the control of the military. This has remained a subject of academic interest since antiquity with ideas relating to the problem of controlling 'the guardians' of the State. Examples include Sun Tzu in ancient China, the Poet Juvenal of Rome, and Niccolo Machiavelli of medieval Florence. In contemporary works, the role of the guardians has been recognised as a major consequence of the societal factors that exist in a country (Huntington, 1957: 2).

In a democracy, the military's role is shaped by the directives, monitoring, assessments, and sanctions emanating from authorised civil institutions of the State.

Depending on the form of democratic system practiced, or constitutional provisions of a country, these institutions enjoy the right of control over the armed forces. In one-party states like China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, the military historically grew out of the ruling party during revolutionary struggles. It is subject to the ideology and directives of the State through the party structure. Thus, it is more, or less an arm of the party from which the state derives its power and legitimacy. Within the liberal-pluralist paradigm, democratic control in countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, is said to exist when the military is subordinate not to the ruling party, but to the apex institutions, or governmental arms of the State, which allow other non-governmental actors like the civil society to play some roles in the process of control by societal oversight. By implication, therefore, democratic control of the military is established and thus, consolidated when a plurality of actors are able to perform their respective functions and roles to have an effective and efficient military force that is subordinate to the aspirations of the society.

The role of the military in a newly established democratic system of governance is a function of its acceptance to obey and be accountable to society through direct governmental institutions and scrutiny from societal and international frameworks. Democratic governance generally involves a multiplicity of players whose functions in various degrees, determine the processes and outcomes of decision-making. Accordingly, civilian control is viewed as an interactive process where 'all decisions regarding the composition, use, and resource allocation for the military are taken by democratic leadership and scrutinised by the legislature in line with legitimacy and popular support' (Lunn, 2003: 13). These decisions are taken and executed in a process that involves a spectrum of designated actors spanning the executive, legislative, bureaucratic, military, judicial, societal and international realms.

For the purpose of this article, the liberal-pluralist perspective is adopted. The philosophical basis for the control of the military in most of the new democracies is drawn from Western models of parliamentarianism and presidentialism.

The conception of the term 'new democracies' can be understood within historical and political circumstances. These are states that were once under military, one-party or socialist rule. Between the last three decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, many states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America gradually adopted or reverted to the governance models operating in Western Europe and North America. This entailed 'mimicking' the general attributes and structures of civilian control of the military from the older democratic countries under the guise of security sector reform as articulated by their external development partners.

This article, therefore, identifies and interrogates the conceptual issues in processes, structures and actors associated with control of the military in new democracies. The choice of the scope for this article is justified by the fact that the notion of 'new democracies' is a global phenomenon. For this reason, therefore, the choice of case studies from the global perspective helps in providing more or less generalised contexts as to the actors, processes and structures required in the

democratic control of the military. In this sense, it attempts this exercise within the context of a general assumption. It argues that democratic control of the military is a multifaceted process and is said to be strong when legitimated State organs, societal and international actors can effectively play their respective roles towards institutionalising accountable governance of the civil and non-civil (including the military) realms of the State. This role covers a range of activities spanning policy advocacy and formulation, supervision, monitoring, legislation, sanctioning, coordination, direction, and compliance. These actors are grouped into governmental actors as the elected executives, the legislature, the judiciary, the civilian-led defence ministry, and the military leadership, while the non-governmental actors are the media, civil society, the intelligentsia, and external actors sometimes referred to as development partners.

The article methodically employs qualitative analysis in a thematic presentation style to prescribe the criteria for conceptualising 'democratic control' of the military in a new democracy. It is divided into four important sections: introduction, an interrogation of concepts and paradigms in the existing body of literature, re-conceptualising democratic control of the military in new democracies, and conclusion.

Democratic Control of the Military: Conceptual Perspectives

The literature on democratic control of the military is one of the many dimensions in the accumulated works on civil-military relations. It covers definitions, descriptions, and explanations of the subject matter. From the liberal-pluralist perspective, there is an agreement that one of the major attributes of a democratic system is the civilian control of the military, or to be specific, with respect to liberal democracy (Karl, 1990: 2; Diamond, 2002: 213; Kura, 2009: 271). It is important to state that the discourse on civilian control of the military is not restricted to those countries adhering to a liberal-pluralist trajectory of democracy, but extends to other forms of polities that span the history of state formation. Civilian control has been identified in ancient China, where it is noted that military command was subordinated to the political structures of the imperial court (Fukuyama, 2012: 135-137). This is reinforced by the prescriptions of strategist Sun Tzu (1999: 125) as the military commander receiving his orders from the ruler. In a study of Athenian civil-military relations, Bogna (2006:10) notes that the autonomy of the council of generals (strategia) was curtailed by civilians to prevent military intervention. Due to the treachery and intrigues that plagued the warring city-states of the 16th century Italy, Machiavelli (1999: 41) prescribed close monitoring and dismissal (where necessary) of suspicious and incompetent military commanders, respectively.

In the modern era, Huntington (1957) gives a more detailed examination of civilian control by defining it within objective and subjective categories: an objective type exists where the ideological base of the country is geared towards establishing and enhancing military professionalism. The power of civilian groups and that of the military are balanced where each keeps to its sphere of professional competence. In addition, Luckham (1971: 22) notes that political constraints and professional self-

interest are the driving forces that shape objective civilian control. In the subjective type, military professionalism is compromised as a result of politicisation and this has to do with the ideological intrusion of civilian groups into the sphere of military matters (Huntington, 1957: 80-85). By implication, objective control where civil and military powers are separated is the prescription for states adopting a liberal political system. On the basis of autonomy, objective control can be either delegative or assertive. In the first case, the civilian leaders assign certain aspects of authority to the military, which lacks the expertise to make decisions. In the second case, a lack of trust compels civilian authorities to directly monitor the military by intruding into its sphere of professional competence (Feaver, 1992: 7-9). Objective civilian control is derived from the experiences of countries in North America and Europe in the last three centuries. Democratic control from the perspective of oversight is seen as a strategic interaction involving two players - the principal who is the democratically-elected civilian leader and the agent, which is the military. An important point to note is that the military is not seen as a player in the control process but as a delegated actor with no choices in decision-making. Its level of compliance determines the type of rewards, or punishments it receives from the civilian principals (Feaver, 2003).

The fused approach, a critique of the separation model explains civilian control from the perspective of an agreement between the military, political elites, and the citizens on issues of governance that pertain to the jurisdiction of military power (Schiff, 2009: 32-33). Case studies of India, Israel, and Pakistan are used to demonstrate the relevance of the fused approach. The significance of this approach lies in the argument that a political system does not necessarily have to adhere to Huntington's model of separate civil and military institutions, but must be based on the autonomous specialisation and competence of the military institution to carry out its security function.

From the liberal-pluralist lens, democratic control of the military can be conceived from a number of progressive waves of debates one of which is christened by its critics as 'the first generation problematic' conceptualises the issue by giving exclusivity to elected leaders namely; the executive and the legislature, as the sole custodians of democratic control of the military (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 6). Democratic control is simply based on the principle of civilian supremacy with the authority to exercise parliamentary oversight (Born, 2006:153). In explicit terms, the executive and legislative arms of a democratic government should have a monopoly over the control of the military (Kuehn, 2018: 163). The second wave takes a broader view by its recognition of both governmental and societal actors as elements in the process of democratic control of the military (Douglas, 2015: 20). In other words, non-governmental actors such as civil society play an important role in ensuring that the 'tenets of transparency and accountability' are applicable to the existence and operational use of the military (Ebo, 2005: 4). In recognition of the forces of democratisation and their impact on civil-military relations, the third argument, apparently, incorporates certain actors in the international arena as part of the players that shape democratic control of the military (Matei, 2013: 3

Actors in Democratic Control of the Military

The liberal-democratic arena is assumed to be shaped by a multiplicity of actors. By extension, democratic control of the military involves a range of actors that include the governmental leaders, wider civilian elite, civil society, military top brass, and officer corps (Huntington, 1956: 380-384). These actors have been identified in different ways depending on the roles they are expected to play. In the case of oversight of the military in American-style presidentialism, Feaver (2003: 98-99), while identifying two sets of players or actors, goes further to break them into multiple sets of principals (the president, legislature, and defence secretary) and multiple sets of agents (the army, navy, air-force, marines, the quasi-autonomous joint staff, etc.). In most presidential systems, the executive enjoys the direct control of the military, while the legislature acts as a check to regulate executive power over the military and to hold both accountable through procedural scrutiny of its missions and budgetary expenses. Feaver's submission is problematic as it is largely based on the civil-military experiences in the United States. It does not take into cognisance the European model or the variations in presidential democracies across the globe and the command structures of their respective militaries.

Another work that examines the 'new democracies' of Eastern Europe identifies in clear terms, five actors and their respective roles in the process of control. Two are principal actors, that is, the executive and legislature, while the rest, may be seen as constituting societal actors - the media, civil society, and non-governmental experts (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 6-9). The principals, more or less enjoy the prerogatives of making decisions concerning the role of the military in terms of the formulation, supervision, control, and oversight of defence and military policies. While defence policy as an exclusive civilian prerogative covers guidelines on the deployment and use of military force, military policy is an aspect that is jointly agreed upon by the military and its civilian principal. It dwells on the structure, doctrines, training, equipment, and missions of the military (Croissant & Kuehn, 2017: 4).

With reference to democratic governance in the security sector of African states, the five key actors are identified based on either the formal roles they play in governance structures or the influence wielded in the policy process. Military leadership is categorised as part of the process of converting policy or law into projecting military power during authorised missions. The legislative and executive actors handle the management and oversight of the organisations authorised by law to use force. The third is the judiciary and other public bodies charged with ensuring that such coercive bodies are constrained from, or penalised for harming public safety. Civil society and non-state security actors are seen as those who exert varying degrees of influence over the process and outcome of governance (Ball & Fayemi, 2004: 17).

However, the capacity of supportive actors as manifested in 'societal oversight' is recognised as a 'formal element' in the democratic control process (Douglas, 2015). These are civil society, the media, and the intellectual community. While these actors do not formally exercise control over the military, they can serve as interest

articulators by making technical and ethical inputs for decision-making within the executive and legislative circles. A functional civil society enhances public scrutiny of the military and its principals (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 9). The media is seen as an important means of communication between the government, society and the military (Douglas, 2015: 21). The intellectual community, drawn from the ivory tower and research centres has relevance in the theorisation and application of ideas towards revolution in military doctrines, technology and industrialisation, which is what obtains in the well-established democracies.

Democratic Control of the Military: Characteristics

Based on the experiences in Western Europe and North America, some perspectives identify what is viewed as the fundamental attributes of democratic control of the military. There exist conceptual variations, especially in the use of the term 'civilian control' in some writings with a shift to 'democratic control' in more recent works on the subject.

In the first submission where Quaker-Dokubo (2002: 41-43) uses the term 'civilian control', three broad features highlighted below are required to manifest for control to be effective in a democratic setting:

1. There should be a clear role for the military in a democratic setting;
2. There should be an effective governance mechanism based on an independent judiciary and the rule of law to ensure accountability of the military to the legislature; and
3. The government should check the power of the military either by limiting its numerical size and resource base, consigning it to external missions, or establishing a parallel agency to serve as a countervailing force.

A problem with this submission is the detachment of structural peculiarities in newly democratising states. This is evident in Africa where weak institutions, economic crisis and the resultant instability compels ruling civilian groups to rely on coercive military power to suppress political opposition and societal agitations. This is the case for countries like Nigeria, Chad, and the Congo Democratic Republic.

A second position adopts the term 'democratic control' where three sources provide five attributes, which can also be viewed as conditionalities: there should be a clearly defined legal, or constitutional framework that places a division of jurisdiction between civilian authorities and the military institution. By implication, it must comply with the separation model of civil-military relations; a clear chain of command should be in place with the civilian leaders giving directives to the military and holding its actions accountable through legislative oversight; a civilian-led supervisory agency or defence ministry should operate and the military command should be subordinated to this agency.

In essence, the military should be subject to bureaucratic-supervisory control by civilians who are answerable to elected authority; the existence of civil society and other non-governmental actors that indirectly play advocacy

roles in the policy environment; and the defence budget should be under the scrutiny of civilian leaders at both formulation and implementation levels (Born, 2006: 158-159; Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002b: 7; Joo, 1996: 5).

The third position pursues five objectives in the establishment of democratic control. These are military effectiveness, military efficiency, governmental support, societal support, and military cooperation through its expertise to defend the state and the society (Cleary, 2006: 43). Ebo (2005) provides some prescriptive, but intrinsic features that should define the role of security forces and the military (inclusive) in a democratic setting. These are: the military is obliged to be accountable and transparent to the civilian authorities by adhering to the principles of public expenditure management, as well as domestic constitutional law and international law; there should be a clear hierarchy of authority between civilian leaders and the military; on their part, civilian authorities must have the capacity for control and oversight of the military, which creates a conducive environment for an active role in social monitoring and participation in policy reform by civil society; and the civilian authorities must provide access to professional training of the military and security forces that are aligned with democratic practices and formulate policies within sub-regional and regional requirements (Ebo, 2005: 4). These perspectives, while having some variations are based on the experience of Eastern Europe where the North Atlantic Alliance transplanted the liberal ethos of civil-military governance after the collapse of the communist rule. The recipients include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. Similarly, the post-Socialist States of Europe had strong and functional state structures before they transited to parliamentary democracies. As such, they did not face the quantum of institutional challenges faced by transiting states in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Determinants of Democratic Control

In examining civilian control of the military in less developed states, the factors of legitimacy and effectiveness are essential conditions. Society must regard the type of political system in operation as legitimate (Goldsworthy, 1981: 55). This, in turn, leverages public institutions to be effective. In essence, civilian control is said to be established when the institutions of the state are legitimate and effective. Recent literature identifies the structural criteria under which democratic control of the military takes place.

Cleary and McConville (2006: 8) identify six major factors for what they term the 'democratic management' of the military institution. These are: the degree of cooperation, or confrontation between civilian authority and the military; the ability of civilian leaders to differentiate between 'state security' and 'regime security'; the degree of dynamism in defence policy direction; and the legislative capacity to perform oversight functions of the military. This reflects the extent to which military power can effectively meet the requirements of the changing security architecture. High democratic control implies that the military is compelled, or persuaded to align

itself with the aspirations of elected leaders. In polities where the factionalised civilian groups are diametrically opposed to each other's interests, the military may exploit such an opportunity to resist directives from civil authority. In unstable polities, the tendency is for the ruling group to preserve its monopoly of power over and above societal aspirations for change and the military is often hijacked to preserve the status quo. This depends on the quality of the roles, strategies, resources allocated, and goals agreed upon by authorities for the military. To some extent, capacity depends on the expertise that the legislature possesses on military matters and how it can leverage to have control over the efficiency and effectiveness of the military's role. An institutional challenge exists in countries where the military command has supplanted the civilian bureaucracy charged with the administrative and fiscal aspects of defence management policy. In Myanmar, for instance, the military (*Tatmadaw*) has retained extensive prerogatives under the 2008 constitution after the transition to democratic rule. It controls the defence and interior ministries in addition to having veto power over parliamentary decisions relating to defence and foreign policies (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018: 206). These prerogatives were leveraged to displace the civilian government in a coup d'état in February 2021, when the outcome of the general elections was not in favour of its organisational interests. The last determinant of civilian control is the level of social capital cultivated between the military, government, and society. Suspicion can lead to either intrusive monitoring of the military by civilian leaders as suggested by Feaver (2003: 91) in an old presidential democracy like the United States, or inversely results in persistence by military leaders to retain certain areas of decision-making related to defence policy as is the case during the early years of Nigeria's Fourth Republic (Aiyede, 2013: 167-168). It is important to point out that these determinants do not take into cognisance the history and trajectory of democratic transition for fragile states like Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, or Thailand where the military continues to play a central role in decision-making amidst a factionalised group of civilian elites.

In his submission, Houngnikpo (2010: 129) prescribes three fundamental pillars that must be present for democratic control of the military. With reference to Africa, he advocates for 'tight normative constraints' on the military to reduce its 'political' influence. Secondly, while adopting the objective model of Huntington (1957), Houngnikpo (2010) argues for a clear separation of the civilian and military spheres of power. Finally, the military should be clearly differentiated from other legally sanctioned institutions of coercion like the police, or paramilitary bodies on the basis of restricting the military to external missions. Democratic control of the military is viewed as a multi-purpose policy for either curbing the power of the military or aligning military policy with civilian-crafted defence policy. In the same light, there is the responsibility of ensuring that human rights are not subject to violations by the military and other security forces; there is a need to provide legitimacy by elected civilians to military operations and to generally strike a balance between the functional and societal imperatives of the military (Born, 2006: 155). Many countries that recently transited to democracies in Africa, Asia, and Latin

America have weak civilian institutions and thus, are unable to curb the prerogatives of the military and other security agencies. Countries such as Nigeria employed certain mechanisms like the purging of the officer corps in the struggle to establish democratic control of their militaries. This has been discussed by Young (2006: 24-29) as in imposing certain limitations on missions, size, and budget, promotion of military professionalism in order to forestall praetorian tendencies, imposition of constitutional and legal limitations, and having a free press that facilitates societal scrutiny of the military institution. From the angle of presidential control of the military, Feaver (2003: 94) similarly identifies intrusive monitoring of defence policy, budget cuts, purges, and court-martial as ways to punish the military for counteracting civilian directives. However, in a study of civilian and military groups in Venezuela, Trinkunas (2005: 5) identifies the restriction of the military to missions beyond the country's borders as the best and most effective strategy for establishing civilian control in a democracy. These short and medium-term strategies are valuable for civilian governments, but for democratic control to be self-sustaining, there is a need to establish principles, norms, and rules that are clearly accepted by civilian and military leaders, which define the responsibilities of the key players who ensure stability and sustenance in democratic governance.

Re-conceptualising Democratic Control of the Military in New Democracies

Democratic control of the military is a product of many actors and their corresponding functions. As a multifaceted process, these actors exercise different functions, which collectively provide the nature and basis for democratic control of the military. Based on the General Systems theory, democratic control is viewed as a system whose general function is dependent on the roles of the parts that constitute it. Each part has its functional boundary in various degrees. It interacts with the rest of the system and the role it plays affects its character and efficacy (Winter & Bellows, 1981: 24). Thus, democratic control of the military represents the whole, while the different actors and the roles they play are the parts that collectively translate to the whole. The process of democratic control is made up of four categories of actors that exercise functions specific to each of them. The first category consists of the elected civilians as in the elected branch of the executive arm (that is, the president, cabinet, or prime minister) and the legislature who take decisions at the highest level concerning the establishment, funding, equipping, roles, and operations of the military. The political executive (who is the president, prime minister, or executive cabinet) makes policy decisions concerning the operational use of the military. The legislature exercises control by legitimising the missions of the military and preventing the misuse of military power within the scope of the appropriative and legal powers conferred on it. It should be able to hold the military accountable for its actions during peacetime, emergency periods, and internal, or foreign missions (Giraldo, 2006: 35-36). However, this depends on the powers conferred on it by the constitution of the country. This is in addition to the goals, integrity, aspirations, and calibre of those who constitute the legislature (Jimoh, 1999: 3).

The second category of actors covers three legitimated institutions; the judiciary, the Ministry of Defence, and the military leadership (high command). They represent the adjudicative, bureaucratic, and strategic aspects of the democratic control process. The judiciary as one of the three arms of government should be able to hold military personnel accountable when the fundamental laws of the state are violated (Quaker-Dokubo, 2002: 42). The military is expected to accept the supremacy of judicial decisions within the scope of civilian directives and the constitution. While it does not enjoy the prerogative of interfering in the military justice system, the judiciary should have the capacity for judicial review of court-martial cases on appeal to civilian courts of competence (Ball & Fayemi, 2004: 21; Ojo, 2006: 260). The Ministry of Defence exists as a civilian-led interface agency between the political executive and the military leadership. It is the bureaucratic stage of the executive's control of the military. For it to be effective, it must have jurisdiction over the administrative and fiscal aspects of defence policy. Its major function is to supervise and ensure that the military is able to carry out policy directives to its logical ends at the lowest possible costs to the country (Bruneau & Goetze Jr, 2006: 78-82).

The military high command is a crucial actor in the process of civilian control of the military in a democratic environment. It is made up of the service chiefs who are heads of the conventional branches - army, navy, and air force. The high command is to the military institution what the brain is to the human body. Since representation is a feature of modern democracy, military leaders must provide professional representation for their constituency in their interactions with decision-makers and societal actors. They serve as the 'hinge' between the Ministry of Defence and the service branches (comprising officers and men under its control) to facilitate compliance with civilian directives (Agwunobi, 1992: 55). This applies to both objective and subjective types of civilian control as no military force can be controlled without its commanders. Politicians and bureaucrats depend on the service chiefs for the democratic control of the military institution to be established as it is a process requiring shared responsibility between civilian and military leaders (Bland, 2001: 9-10). The factors of social trust and cooperation between the civilian and military leaders are important for defining the roles and jurisdiction of the armed forces (Cleary, 2006: 8). Its general functions are as follows: (1) to establish a partnership with civilian authorities to insulate the military from the partisan persuasions of elected groups and opposition (Yoroms, 2012: 139-140); (2) to facilitate the internalisation of the norms and values that project the supremacy of civil institutions of the state (Welch & Smith, 1974: 6); (3) to synthesise policy directives received from the civilian principals into strategy; and (4) to apply strategy towards the attainment of policy objectives within the context of military doctrines. In a pyramidal pattern, the military leadership enjoys strategic control over the operational commanders who, in turn, supervise the lower hierarchy of the military to execute directives. The role of military leaders is crucial in establishing or restoring civilian control in a democracy confronted by instability and crises of political legitimacy. For example, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez

survived a civilian-led uprising in April 2002 due to the military command's refusal to legitimise the opposition's claim to power (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2009).

The domestic societal actors as the civil society, the media, and the intellectual community, or intelligentsia serve as the social bridge between the government and the society (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002a: 47). They make inputs on the culture of civilian control of the military institution, and the direction of military reform and transformation. Civil society is that active segment of society that is involved in articulating and advocating for proper governance of the military institution. This involves scrutinising the actions of both the government and the military on a wide range of issues that cover human rights abuses, the basis for military missions, budgetary allocations, and equipment procurements (Fluckiger, 2008). However, the role of civil society varies from one country to another. In cases where democratic culture has not taken root, civil groups can serve as both a pillar of civilian authority and a check on military praetorianism (Gaji, 2016: 564-565). In Argentina, the military 'recused' itself from supporting the elected government of Fernando De la Rua in December 2001 amidst mass opposition to harsh economic policies. The president was eventually forced to resign (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2009). In some countries, civil society has been involved in facilitating military intervention to displace elected civilian leaders. Examples include Chile's Salvador Allende in 1973, Sudan's Sadiq Al-Mahdi in 1989, Pakistan's Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and Egypt's Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

Another societal actor is the media, which plays an important role in political communication and role perceptions among the civilian authorities, the military, and society. Depending on societal perceptions, the media can serve as an ally or an adversary of the military (Scholtz, 1998). The intelligentsia largely interacts with civilian and military leaders in formulating and evaluating defence policy as it pertains to strategic planning, budgeting, procurement, and the development of a technological base. As think tanks, they can assist the civilian authorities to enhance monitoring and direction (Bland, 1999, p. 13).

The last category, which is often not highlighted in most writings consists of actors emanating from the international stage. Sometimes referred to as development partners or agents of the global hegemon, they consist of foreign governments, inter-governmental organisations, and transnational non-governmental bodies. The relevance of these actors is hinged on the decision in the 1990s to link development assistance to the idea of security sector reform in less developed countries facing economic crises (Brzoska, 2003). Western governments pushed creditor and donor bodies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund including regional bodies such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) to place the principle of good governance as an agenda for non-democratising states. These 'development partners' engage with the governmental and non-governmental actors in the domestic environment of a country to support democratisation as a condition for assistance in addressing pressing economic needs such as loan requests and debt relief. In the same direction, such assistance is extended for the professionalisation of the military so that it continues to accept the supremacy of civil institutions. This

'conditional' assistance for democratising states is also meant to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of their militaries and enhance civilian control during internal and external missions. Military effectiveness is geared towards obedience to elected authorities within the context of defence policy, while military efficiency has to do with carrying out missions at an acceptable cost to society (Bruneau & Trinkunas, 2008: 10). The governments of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in different ways extended military assistance to many African, Asian and Latin American states as part of the drive for security sector reform. With respect to Africa, the United States provides military training, intelligence, and equipment sales using platforms namely; the Africa Command (AFRICOM), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Military Professionals Resource Incorporated (MPRI). The goal of such arrangements is to promote its security interests in the continent by enhancing the military effectiveness of recipient states. In the case of post-communist Europe, the trend is for a candidate country to get co-opted into transnational security outfits namely; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). International non-governmental bodies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight the levels of human rights compliance by the military during missions within, or beyond a country's borders. They can lobby foreign governments to halt military assistance to a country that is seen as derailing democratic tenets. They provide financial and technical support to domestic interest groups who engage their governments in reform directions for the military institution.

It must be noted that these categories of actors operate within a contextual structure, each occupying a position in the process of control as principal, monitor, supervisor, or agent. The operational structure of democratic control of the military in a new democracy can be represented as a concentric arena (see Figure 1) where the military leaders or strategic commanders are positioned at the heart of this process as gatekeepers and facilitators. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) forms the next echelon as the supervisor of defence policy. It enjoys delegated authority emanating from its elected principals. The next circle is the decision-making environment involving three principles - executive, legislature, and judiciary. They respectively have the authority to formulate and direct military operations and legitimise defence policy, and adjudicate on military matters. Societal forces constitute the fourth circle they scrutinise or support the military and its principles. The authority to use military forces and its outcome are aspects of interest and discourse among the media, civil society, and intelligentsia. The international actors exert influence on civilian leaders, society and the military to establish and sustain the policy of civilian control of the military through punishments and rewards.



Figure - 1 Conceptual Model of Democratic Control of the Military in New Democracies

Democratic control of the military can be gauged as high, moderate, or low based on the examination of five critical decision-making areas of possible contestations between the military and civilian leaders. When civilian leaders enjoy a monopoly to make decisions in these critical areas and the military accepts their prerogatives, democratic control can be regarded as high. Inversely, when the military shares, or dominates decision-making in these areas, democratic control is said to be low (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, Volkel & Wolf, 2011: 78-79; Croissant & Kuehn, 2017: 4). The capacities and dispositions of civilian elites and the military determine the degree to which democratic control can be exercised and sustained. The first is the sphere of elite recruitment - the process and criteria for selecting and legitimising civilian leadership. The military must accept the mechanism by which civilian leaders are periodically selected and must accept their right to make decisions on behalf of the electorate. In situations of intra-civilian power struggles, the military may have a role in deciding how political succession takes place through the execution of a palace coup. For example, the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) has been involved as a player in the succession struggles within the ZANU-PF ruling party and by extension, the government. The Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) intervened in concert with rival factions within the ruling party to replace Robert Mugabe with Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, in November 2017. The second has to do with public policy-making. This implies that the military should not be setting the agenda in policy-making. Similarly, civilian leaders should have effective police and intelligence services to prevent military intrusion into internal security matters. In Colombia and Nigeria, the police forces are overwhelmed and unable to tackle internal security threats. This has resulted in the military assuming peacekeeping and quasi-policing roles. In fact, the Colombian military and police forces are jointly controlled by the Ministry of Defence.

The fourth is the arena of defence policy where civilian leaders must have the capacity to decide when, where, and how military forces are deployed. In Pakistan, military autonomy has resulted in successive civilian governments sharing decision-making with a high command on the country's nuclear deterrence strategy. The final arena lies in a military organisation. In this case, civilians may decide to be intrusive or grant autonomy to military leaders to make such decisions. This depends on the expertise that civilian leaders have on military policy and the level of mutual trust established by the government and military leaders. This covers training and operational doctrine, strategic planning, budgeting, technology, procurement, and personnel recruitment. However, the principles and practices of the military organisation must be aligned with the policy objectives laid down by civilian decision-makers. In states such as Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand, which have semblances of electoral democracy, the military enjoys prerogatives over internal security, national defence, and military organisation to the detriment of factionalised civilian groups.

Conclusion

This article examined the issues surrounding the phenomenon of democratic control of the military in new democracies. The dominant paradigm in the literature was discovered to have neglected the role of societal and external forces in the phenomenon of democratic control of the military. It generally gives prominence to governmental institutions notably, the executive and legislature. In retrospect, it is important to recall the roles played by the domestic social forces of these countries and the currents of political globalisation in shaping the transition of these countries that were under single-party, military, or personal rule. Thus, the structure and process of democratic control of the military in these countries should include a wider range of actors as the environment of democratic governance involves the participation (in various degrees) of governmental, societal, and international players whose respective roles determine the trajectories and efficacies of political development.

In the same light, there is a gap between the ideal situation and the real world with respect to the benchmark for assessing the concept and practices associated with the democratic control of the military. In other words, there is no uniformity in the applicability of what is considered to be democratic control of the military for all countries. This is in terms of the features, roles, and impacts. Trends indicate some divergence and this has to do with three major reasons. These are: the nature of democratic transition; the level of political stability; and the strategic interests of external forces. With reference to countries like Argentina, the last military junta was compelled by social discontent, an economic crisis and pressures to relinquish power to civilians after the 1982 disastrous Falklands War with Britain. Successive civilian governments leveraged on this opportunity to consolidate control of the military. In retrospect, politicians and civil servants in India formed an alliance to exclude the military from having any prerogatives and internalise the values of civilian supremacy.

With reference to political stability, the legitimacy of civilian leaders and the political order are important in defining the role of the military either as a veto player, or a submissive agent. In the same direction, this heavily depends on the affinity that societal forces have with state institutions and their leaders (Finer, 2002: 87). When societal attachment to public institutions in a new democracy is weak, there is a tendency for democratic control of the military to be low and vice versa. This has been the case in Pakistan where there has been an alternation of civilian and military regimes since its independence in 1947. The military has established itself as an autonomous guardian of the state and thus, shaped the national defence and security directions for the country due to the intense and entrenched factionalism of civilian elites.

The strategic interests of the Western powers in the political developments of new democracies determine their reactions with regard to the outcomes of civil-military struggles for control of political power. This is exemplified in their soft posture toward the apparent truncation of democratic transitions in countries like Algeria in 1992, Pakistan in 1998, Egypt in 2013, and Thailand in 2014. An unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016 by some military units in Turkey against the pro-Islamist-AK government was accompanied by mute reactions from Western capitals. In contrast, Nigeria came under intense diplomatic pressure between 1993 and 1998 in an effort to end the military rule. As such, there is no universal applicability in the policy of democratic promotion by such powers either through their governments, or international bodies because each case study is shaped by the interests to be pursued. For new democracies, the structures and actors in the process of control of the military vary as each country in question has its own peculiarities in terms of history, institutions, and vulnerabilities to external influences.

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IMPROVING COURSEWORK AND PRACTICUM FOR A BETTER INITIAL TEACHER EDUCATION IN ZAMBIA

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Abstract

The article aims at proposing the improvement of initial teacher education in Africa. The authors used desk research to put together the arguments contained in this article. The main proposals of the chapter are two-fold. Firstly, the article proposes expansion of the teacher education coursework to include action research, African knowledge systems and intercultural education. Secondly, the article proposes a versatile practicum for initial teacher education. The practicum must be used for assessment and for professional development and teaching purposes. This chapter concludes that to produce the teacher of the 21st century, teacher preparation programmes must focus on active intellectual engagement by which teachers are equipped with requisite professional knowledge and skills. This agrees with the constructivist teaching/learning theory and participatory teaching methods, which advocate for active participation by students in the learning process. In this theory, learners are supposed to take charge of their learning through inquiry or discovery. To concretise this knowledge and skills acquisition through the practicum, the authors recommend for Zambia and indeed Africa, the school-based model. This preference for the school-based model is anchored on the fact that it is a much better model because, by attaching students to schools right from the first year of the programme, they will have adequate time for combining theory and practice and for developing correct professional dispositions.

Keywords: Initial Teacher Education, Mentor, Teacher Education, Teacher Training, Student Teachers, Practicum

Introduction

The quality of a nation depends on the quality of its citizens. The quality of citizens depends not exclusively but in critical measure upon the quality of their education. The quality of education depends more than upon any single factor on the quality of their teacher (American Commission on teacher education, cited in the Concept of Teacher Education; Kakuba *et al*., 2015). This assertion is in agreement with Deacon (2016) who postulates that education research, the world over, is in increasing agreement that the most important determinants of educational quality is the competencies of teachers. There is no doubt from the statements above that the teachers' competencies are one variable, which impart on the learners' achievement. That is, they are decisive to the learners' outcomes.

for example, the practicum is weak. It remains weak not only in Zambia but throughout the sub-Saharan Africa (Mweemba *et al*., 2015; Manchishi & Mwanza, 2013; Cabbold, 2011). In crafting this article, the authors have relied on an expansive desktop review of existing literature on the topic of teacher education to which they have added their own thoughts.

The article is divided into seven broad sections. The first is the introduction, which lays out the critical issues and questions that underpin the discussion. The second section forms a conceptual discussion that addresses key issues of initial teacher education, the dichotomy between teacher training and teacher education and the practicum. The third section proposes a new course regime for teacher education, while the fourth section describes in detail the practicum and is followed by a brief outline of practicum models. Thereafter, the chapter presents notable shortcomings associated with the practicum in Zambia and attendant suggestions to strengthen it. The conclusion sums up the narratives emerging out of the discourse on improving practicum for better initial teacher education.

Conceptual Definitions

Initial Teacher Education

In pre-service teacher education, teaching skills are acquired through linking theory and practice in real classroom environments. In this study, qualitative studies that focused on teacher education in general and the school practicum in particular, in Africa were reviewed (Tas & Karabay, 2016). Research has found that the school practicum is valuable for the development of teaching skills for the teacher education students. This is the case regardless of the mode of teacher education that is adopted; be it the concurrent model (Zuzovsky & Donitsa-Schmidt, 2017; Sederevičiūtė-Pačiauskienė & Vainorytė, 2015; Luangala, 2008)) or the consecutive or serial model (Consuegra, Engels & Struyven, 2014, cited in Sederevičiūtė-Pačiauskienė and Vainorytė, 2015). Under the concurrent model, disciplinary and pedagogical studies are integrated and taught at the same time. It involves education in subject content, pedagogy and practicum. The consecutive model, on the other hand, focuses mostly on pedagogy for those graduates that have a subject degree, without teacher qualification, but who are interested in getting into teaching.

As previously mentioned, initial teacher education is the entry-level qualification that is completed before entering the service as a teacher (Neigh & Lynch, 2017). It is the first phase in the teacher's professional career. The purpose of initial teacher education is to equip student teachers with knowledge, attitudes, behaviours and skills they will need to effectively perform their functions in the classroom, school and indeed in the wider community. It is during this period that they gain an understanding of what is involved in the teaching career and what it means to be a teacher. This calls for diversified competencies. Some of these competencies are subject, didactic, social, adaptive, developmental and professional competencies. Subject competence requires that student teachers be grounded in and master the

subjects (content) they are to teach. Didactic competence demands that mastering the content is not adequate in itself. Student teachers should be able to effectively deliver the content they have mastered. It also involves helping learners to learn how to learn. The other competence is social competence. This competence requires student teachers to be able to interact and communicate ably. They should be able to provide their experiences, stimulate learners to learn to cooperate with parents and should be encouraged to work with colleagues as a team (Teamwork). Adaptive and developmental competence, is also one of the competencies that requires the student teachers to be able to update academic and teaching methods frequently. It requires exposing them to change and instituting innovations. They should also be able to initiate new activities. Last but not the least, there is professional ethics. This competence requires that student teachers be able to differentiate general morals and ethics from the specific teaching professional ethics. This is the type of teacher we are looking for in the 21st century. But to have this kind of teacher, it needs to be clear whether an institution is following a teacher training programme or a teacher education programme.

Teacher Education as Opposed to Teacher Training

To help underscore the need for a competent teacher, the authors found it necessary to differentiate and clarify two concepts namely; teacher training and teacher education. Although to a layperson, this argument appears philosophical and academic, to a seasoned scholar of education, there is an ocean of a difference between the two concepts. In his review of the literature on this subject, Banja (2022) has arrived at a clear distinction between teacher training and teacher education. While teacher training focuses on mechanical routinisation and implementation of work offloaded to teachers by others, with a focus on preparing teachers in the routine tasks teachers do in a school, teacher education, on the other hand, emphasises active intellectual engagement by teachers in the work that they do. In other words, teacher education implies all the activities, which develop and enhance the professional competencies of teachers during initial, induction and in-service phases of their career. It is clear from these overarching positions that the purpose of a teacher education programme is to facilitate the preparation of quality competent teachers that are equipped with requisite professional knowledge and skills (Banja, 2022). The section that follows, zeroes in on initial teacher education.

Proposals for Improving Initial Teacher Education

The traditional courses that the current initial teacher education curriculum framework in Zambia offers, composed of one or two teaching subjects and methods courses, in addition to the foundational courses of theory and practice, history and philosophy of education, sociology of education, educational psychology, for the secondary school teachers, are, in our view, inadequate. There is a need to broaden the teacher education curriculum so that it is in tandem with the educational dynamics of our time. Curriculum

in teacher education should ensure that there is a shift from teacher training to teacher education. As already alluded to, teacher training focuses on mechanical routinisation and implementation of work offloaded to teachers by others, and preparing teachers in the routine tasks they do in a school. Teacher education, on the other hand, emphasises on active intellectual engagement by teachers in the work that they do.

Preparing such a teacher as discussed in the previous section calls for a participatory teacher education regime in which student teachers play an active role in their education process. They should be participants of a self-directed and self-taught process. Every aspect of their teacher preparation should be based on reflection and introspection (Akyempong, 2003 cited in the Concept of Teacher Education). This is in line with the Constructivist Teaching/Learning Theory and participatory teaching methods which advocate for active participation by students in the learning process and which guided this study. In this theory, learners are supposed to take charge of their learning through inquiry or discovery. The teacher/teacher educator simply acts as a facilitator or a provider of an enabling environment for the students to learn. In this vein, Von Glasersfeld (1989) has argued that knowledge is not passively received but built by the recipient.

Improving Coursework

As argued above, there is a need to broaden the teacher education curriculum so that it is in tandem with the educational dynamics of our time. Student teachers should be participants of a self-directed and self-taught process. Every aspect of their teacher preparation should be based on reflection and introspection (Akyempong, 2003 cited in the Concept of Teacher Education). Following this line of thought, the authors are proposing the generic curriculum for the initial teacher education coursework presented in Figure 1. The proposed model incorporates traditional teaching subjects, foundational courses and methods courses. Significantly, however, this model includes a number of additional courses such as action research, intracultural studies and indigenous knowledge systems.

Figure 1: Proposed Courses for Initial Teacher Education

While the majority of the courses in teacher education programmes have a regular familiarity, this article proposes inclusion of a few courses that are not yet popular in most teacher education programmes. These are ICT and its use, inclusive education, guidance and counselling, indigenous knowledge, teaching in intracultural classes (Anthropology) and action research. The following section briefly explains these courses.

The need for the latest knowledge and skills in methodology that encompasses the use of ICT is key to a modern teacher. In relation to this study proposes the use of the video practicum. With regard to inclusive education, the authors observe that while inclusive education has over the past two decades become increasingly common in most teacher education programmes in Africa, the understanding is still blurred.

The worsening socio-economic situation in Africa has left many a learner needing guidance and counselling in many aspects of their lives. This will respond to the emotional, psychological, social and other needs of learners. The increase in the number of suicide deaths among school-going children in Zambia points to the need for such counselling. This requires the teacher to be equipped with the necessary guidance and counselling skills to help such learners as opposed to peripheral counselling.

In recent decades, there has been a movement for the decolonisation of Africa, which has focused on the decolonisation of the African mind. At the centre of this movement is the content of the education system. Proponents are now more than ever before advocating for the inclusion of African knowledge systems

in the African education curriculum. Not only this, but the removal of certain education content that have colonial vestiges to them. In addition to African knowledge systems, the authors suggest inclusion of teaching in intracultural classes (Anthropology), due to the cultural diversity of the classes the student teachers are going to handle, brought about by immigration, increase in the number of refugees and globalisation of education. This raises the need to equip them with intercultural competency. In other words, the solution to the challenges brought about by diversity in the classroom might lie in intercultural education.

This article also proposes the incorporation of action research as an alternative to the traditionally theoretical and academically-based teaching about research. Action research, whether it uses qualitative and quantitative methods, can contribute significantly to finding solutions to the many challenges that the classroom and school situations present. Literature by most scholars reveals that most research tends to under-emphasise the concerns of the site being investigated. Action research, on the other hand, focuses on addressing whatever practical issues the researcher identifies in their workplace (Stringer, 2014; Mertler, 2014; Johnson, 2012; Dawson, 2011; Herr & Anderson, 2005). Such a course in teacher education will equip students with knowledge and skills to conduct research that finds solutions to clearly identified challenges in the workplace within an educational setting rather than simply contributing to knowledge generation about educational situations in general.

Improving the Practicum

The Standard Council of the Teaching Profession (1998 cited by Cobbold, 2011: p.10) defines teaching practicum as:

> A period of time spent in schools where the prime focus for the trainee teacher is to practice teaching under the supervision of a mentor who should be trained for this job, to spend time with teachers and classes, observing, teaching small groups and whole classes, and undertaking the range of tasks that make up the teacher's role including planning, assessing and reporting.

We now discuss the key component of the initial teacher education which is the practicum. Also known variably as school experience, field experience, school-based experience, internship, professional attachment, teaching practice and practical experience. Practicum is widely acknowledged as a crucial component in the professional development of student teachers (Muzata & Penda, 2014; Masaiti & Machinshi, 2011). Similarly, Zeichner and Liston (1990) make the argument that the quality of teacher education is defined by the quality of teaching practice. Further, Cobbold (2011) asserts that the practicum is rated more highly than any other element of any teacher education programme and recognised as undoubtedly the most effective tool for developing practical skills in students. This is because it grants experience in

real teaching and learning situation. That is, it provides an opportunity to student teachers to learn from experience in the workplace. Ingvarson, Beavis, Kleinhenz and Elliot (2004) state that there is a widespread agreement that professional experience is an integral part of all pre-service teacher education programmes and provides the key link between theory and practice. This seems to lend credibility to the assertion that the professional versatility of the kind of teachers that a programme produces is largely determined by the quality of this hands-on-wheel experience. Emphasising the importance of professional experience, the Australian Council of Deans of Education advances that teacher education programmes should focus on professional experience and that theory and practice should be complementary (Ingvarson *et al.*, 2004).

Therefore, it follows that the purpose of a practicum should be to provide an opportunity for student teachers to practice in schools, activities they will perform, in the future, in their job, in the classroom, in school and indeed in the wider community as opposed to merely demonstrating what they learnt, as is currently the practice. In short, the practicum intends to provide a platform for student teachers to link theory and practice in a sufficiently close relationship that a teacher may be able to resolve everyday teaching problems based on his or her theoretical knowledge in the content area and the teaching methodology.

With regard to the importance of the practicum in initial teacher education, the Education and Training Committee (2005) cited by Cobbold (2011), postulates that:

> Teaching practicum is regarded as the most effective means of preparing preservice teachers to teach the curriculum that schools are accountable for; of preparing them for assessment, reporting and administrative responsibilities, and for the human relations dimensions required for developing relationships with students, colleagues and parents.

In light of these viewpoints, the practicum should be taken seriously because it is a vital element of initial teacher education. It is during the practicum that the student teachers are exposed to the art of teaching before they join the real world of teaching career. In a nutshell, the practicum provides an opportunity to the student teachers to learn from experience in the work field. That is, the practicum provides training in the activities student teachers will perform in the future, in their job. Currently, in Zambia as an example, the practicum is a compulsory component of teacher education.

According to Aglazor (2017), the objectives of the practicum are:

1. To expose student teachers to real-life classroom experience.
2. To provide a forum for student teachers to translate educational theories and principles into practice.
3. To enable student-teachers to discover their strengths and weaknesses in classroom teaching and provide opportunities to enable them to address their weaknesses and enrich their strengths.
4. To familiarise student teachers with the real school environment as their future workplace.

5. To provide student teachers with an opportunity for further acquisition of professional skills, competencies, personal characteristics and experiences for full-time teaching after graduation.
6. To help student teachers develop a positive attitude towards the teaching profession.
7. To serve as a means of assessing the quality of training being provided by teacher training institutions.

Components of the Practicum in Zambia: An Overview

A year before the completion of their training, student teachers are given an opportunity to go into schools for 'school experience.' The activity is mandatory as one cannot graduate without passing it. The duration is generally a school term (almost three months). It is treated as a separate course with its own code. School experience committees headed by coordinators, are in each teacher preparation institution responsible for the planning and administration of the school experience component.

Placement of the Students

As regards the placement of the students, the school experience coordinator facilitates the identification of schools where students can go and teach. In other words, the students are free to teach in the schools of their own choice with the approval of the coordinator.

Students' Teaching

While on the practicum, the students are treated as full-time teachers. In addition to the classroom teaching, they are also required to participate in extra-curricular activities such as; sports, club activities etcetera. Before they actually start teaching, they are in principle supposed to observe experienced teachers' lessons for one week. However, in reality, this rarely takes place.

Assessment

During their stay in schools, student teachers are visited only once by their lecturers to assess their classroom performance. Equally, the schools to which they are attached, are required to assess them. Each teacher preparation institution has in place assessment tool(s), which lecturers and schools use to grade the student teachers. In addition, the student teachers are at the end of the practicum required to submit a teaching file, which should contain among other things, schemes of work, lesson plans, records of work, and assessment grades. Ideally, the overall assessment is supposed to take into consideration the following: lecturer's grade, school grade and the teaching file to arrive at the final grade. In practice, it is only the lecturer's grade, which is considered.

Shortcomings in the Practicum in Zambia

The implementation of the practicum in Zambia is beset by many shortcomings. For example, it has been observed that student teachers are not adequately prepared for the practicum except in terms of what they acquire in the methods courses. In this vain, teacher preparation institutions are encouraged to introduce lectures and tutorials as a preparatory component of the practicum so that students broaden their perception of the hands-on-the-wheel experience.

During the practicum, the student teachers are visited and observed only once by their lecturers for the entire duration of the activity. This affects the quality of feedback provided to the student teachers. Additionally, more often than not, such visits by the lecturers end up being for assessment rather than development and teaching purposes as can be noted from the attached assessment tools. This is common in all the colleges of education and universities in the country. It is quite obvious that an assessment based on just a single observation may not be a reliable and valid way of appraising the classroom competence of a student teacher. This inadequacy is a result of financial constraints since teacher educators who observe the student teachers often have to travel long distances from their institution to observe the students. Transport and lodging costs, plus out of station allowances compel institutions to reduce the exercise to only one visit.

In some cases, although not related to financial constraints, in some institutions, the duration of the practicum falls far less than the recommended full school term. If the period for teaching practice is too short, the practicum is unlikely to make any meaningful contribution to the training of students in methodology. The difficulties are even greater for those students who suffer the handicap of conducting their practicum at the end of the final year of study. This arrangement is not helpful to future teachers as they are denied an opportunity to review with their lecturers, issues arising from the practicum, during the period of the practicum.

It is also important to note that in some cases, the lecturers assigned to observe the student teachers are themselves not specialised in the subject area of the student that they are observing (Muzata, 2018). Clearly, considering the current form of the practicum, the quality of the graduates from some institutions within the country is likely to be questioned because it appears the activity is treated as a ritual to be fulfilled and not as a key part of teacher education. This explains why in some teacher preparation institutions in Zambia, the practicum is not graded and does not contribute points to the classification of the degree that a student is awarded. This affects students not taking the practicum seriously and not putting their best into the exercise.

In light of these negative tendencies associated with the practicum, suggestions are made in the following section to improve the practicum.

Proposals for Improving the Practicum

The following are the suggestions made for improving the practicum; this is

irrespective of the model adopted by individual institutions offering teacher education programmes. In addition, the authors suggest that these matters must not be left to an institution to decide, but must run across all teacher education programmes.

1. A minimum of two observations per student by his/her lecturer must be mandatory during the period of the practicum. It is quite obvious that an assessment based on just a single observation may not be a reliable and valid way of appraising the classroom competence of a student teacher. In addition, school authorities should be involved in assessing the student teachers both in teaching and in professional ethics. The overall assessment should take into consideration the following; lecturer's grade, school grade and a portfolio to arrive at the final grade.
2. The practicum must not be used only for assessment but also for professional development and teaching purposes with quality feedback provided to the student teachers. Assessment tools should reflect this intentionality.
3. The duration of the practicum in all institutions should not be less than one full-term. If the period for teaching practice is too short, it is unlikely to make any meaningful contribution to the training of students in methodology. While in the school, students should be encouraged to reflect on their experiences (on the teaching-learning process). This is known as reflective pedagogy or inquiry-orientated model. This is one of the strategies that should be used to enhance the practicum.
4. All the lecturers assigned to observe the student teachers should themselves be specialised in the subject area of the student they are observing (Muzata, 2018). This would ensure that they contribute to the development of the teacher in terms of both subject content and methodology.
5. The teaching practice must be conducted before the final year of study. This arrangement accords the future teachers an opportunity to review with their lecturers, issues arising from the practicum, during and after the practicum.
6. Specific study areas should have their own appropriate assessment tools, corresponding to their needs and which lecturers and schools use to assess and grade their students.
7. As discussed in the above sections, the current partnership between universities/colleges of education and schools in Zambia, is weak. To improve the practicum component of teacher education, and make it effective, the authors are proposing a partnership whereby some neighboring schools to the teacher preparation institutions be selected to serve as cooperating or professional development schools for whatever delivery model an institution that prepares teachers, chooses to use under the school-based model. In these schools, experienced teachers in the various teaching subjects should officially be appointed as mentors who would be required to undergo some orientation/training in mentorship. There is a need for a stronger focus on mentoring rather than supervision to enrich experiences for students (Manchishi, 2013). A collaboration model is proposed in Figure 2. It emphasises that the fact that the preparation of teachers,

the practicum in particular, is a partnership between universities/colleges of education, schools and other stakeholders in the education system. These are key participants in ensuring the quality of learning on the part of the trainees.

Figure 2: Proposed Partnership Model between Teacher Education Institutions and Schools



Adapted from University of Minnesota (https://www:cehd.umn.edu>co-teaching>pairs'triad)

Practicum Models

There are many different types of teacher education practicum models available to teacher education programmes. The following section discusses some of them in brief.

The Internship Model

The trend now in some countries, for example, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is that each student teacher spends one day a week at a school to observe and familiarise, while he or she spends the other four days at the college or university doing the course work. In the lectures and tutorials set aside as preparation for teaching practice, students could discuss their observations with lecturers so that the former are counselled. The days the students spend at a school gradually increase until they fuse into the teaching practice period properly. This is the method of training known as the internship model (Luangala, 2001), which many countries in the West are increasingly adopting. The internship model also known as the apprenticeship or the realistic model, allows student teachers ample time to adjust to the different scenarios and demands of teaching and enables them to acquire pedagogical skills. With such skills, they are able to devise

appropriate interventions of their own, based on reflective practice to counter emerging challenges. The internship model is a much better model than the immersion one where students suddenly wake up on a day to find they have to wear the mantle of a teacher.

The School-Based Model

The second model is the school-based model. In this model, student teachers spend some time in schools throughout their study period in a college or university. In a nutshell, the future teachers are right from the first year in the university/college of education attached to some school in the neighbourhood. Indiana, Ohio and Michigan universities do practice this model. The only notable difference between the school-based model and the internship model is that in the latter, it is not clear when student teachers should go into schools, while in the other one, it is right from year one in their teacher preparation institution. This model has not been used in Zambia.

The Partner Schools Model

The third model is where students teach in neighbouring schools (partner schools) under the mentorship and close eye of experienced teachers found in these schools (mentors). Stanford University is one of the universities in the USA using this model. This is the model that was implemented in Zambia between 1997 and 2014 with the support of the Danish Government under the Zambia Teacher Education Course (ZATEC). In Zambia, this model was organised along the line of a one-year college-based preparation and one-year field-based experience. It is close to what is known as 'work-integrated learning' in which educational programmes combine and integrate learning and its workplace application regardless of whether it takes place in industry or university and whether it is real or simulated (Atchison *et al*., 2007) cited by Allen *et al.,* (2007).

Unfortunately, like most donor-funded programmes it wound up when the Danish withdrew from the project and the Zambian Government could not afford to pay the allowances that were being paid to student teachers.

The Side by Side Model

Closely related to this model is the 'side-by-side' teaching model. In this model, two teachers, the student teacher and the school-based mentor co-plan a lesson and co-teach it. This arrangement goes on for some time until later on, the student teacher takes over the teaching fully, while the mentor provides necessary backup, feedback and support. Tennessee, Knoxville and St Cloud universities in the USA are among the universities using this model. This model has hardly been used in Zambia.

The Parallel Model

Another model is the 'parallel' model. In this setup, interns co-teach with clinical

teachers in schools known as professional development schools, which work closely with universities in supporting the interns. The model involves aligning theory courses with internships. That is, students learn then later, observe and apply in the classroom. Similarly, this model has not been used in Zambia. This model is similar to the work-integrated learning that combines theory and practice.

The University/College Lab-School Model

Last but not the least model is the one which takes place in what is known as 'university lab'. The University of Illinois in the USA uses this model. It has on its campus, a fully-fledged secondary school (lab-school) in which students first observe lessons before they begin to teach. University lecturers (teacher educators) work with teachers in this school to support the students. This kind of setup can be likened to a university teaching hospital used to train medical doctors. The model was at one time used in Zambia, where all the teacher preparation institutions had what were known as 'demonstration schools.' Unfortunately, these are no longer in existence.

Having closely evaluated the different models presented, the authors recommend for Zambia and indeed Africa, the school-based model. This preference for the school-based model is anchored on the fact that it is a much better model because, by attaching students to schools right from the first year of the programme, they will have adequate time for combining theory and practice and for developing professional dispositions.

Conclusion

This article has critically described the purpose and importance of initial teacher education. Specifically, the focus was on the coursework and the practicum. With reference to Zambia, it is clear that the country is using the practicum model known as the 'Applied Science' model in which, student teachers merely implement what they learn in the methods course. It is also true that the practicum is not effective (Mweemba *et al*., 2015; Manchishi & Mwanza, 2013).The literature reviewed, seems to also suggest that the same is true in sub-Saharan Africa (Zeichner, 1996) cited by Cobbold (2011). From the discussion, it seems logical to infer that the partnership that exists between the sending universities/colleges and the schools where the student teachers are attached for the practicum is very weak.

To enrich the practicum, this study proposes that while on the practicum, student teachers should be encouraged to reflect on their experiences (the teaching-learning process). This is in tandem with what is known as a reflective pedagogy or inquiry-orientation. The authors of the article, therefore, advocate for a practicum, which will prepare an innovator, problem-solver and critical thinker. This calls for a participatory teacher education in which, student teachers play an active role in the training process; they should become participants as self-directed and self-taught. Every aspect of training should be based on reflection and introspection (Akinpelu,

1998 & Pong, 2003 cited in the Concept of Teacher Education, https://archivemu.acmyweb-testsTeacherEdpdf). In this vain, the school-based practicum seems to be the answer for the preparation of teachers for the 21st century.

Currently, teacher preparation seems not to be preparing a reflective teacher. However, it must also be noted that the model adopted strongly influences the quality not only of the practicum but also of the teacher education programme as a whole. The authors suggest that if school practicum is to make any meaningful contribution to the successful preparation of teachers, the length of the practicum/school experience should not be less than a full school term.

Clearly, considering the current form of the practicum, the quality of the graduates from some institutions within the country is likely to be questioned because it appears the activity is treated as a ritual to be fulfilled and not as a key part of teacher education. This explains why in some teacher preparation institutions in Zambia, the practicum is not graded and does not contribute points to the classification of the degree that a student is awarded. This affects students not taking the practicum seriously and not putting their best into the exercise. The authors have shown that the practicum is key, regarding the quality of teacher education and this shows in the impact it has on the quality of education in our schools.

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DECOLONISATION OF THE AFRICAN FESTIVALSCAPE: FESTIVALS FOR WHOM? (CONCEPTUAL PAPER)

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Abstract

The African festivalscape has yet to be traversed from the angle of decoloniality, which points to it requiring some 'unmaking' and 'remaking', to transform it into an entity relatable to its environments. Thus, the lagging behind of the African sphere in festival development may be attributed to a misunderstanding of the 'African festival' construct. This is symptomatic of the residue of colonial hangover observed through systems that still personify former colonisers. This conceptual study seeks to advance festival theory development, by offering insights on festival coloniality deterrents and potential opportunities that may accrue from the decolonisation of the African festivalscape.

Keywords: Festivalscape, Decoloniality, Afrocentric

Introduction

Festivals are fundamentally a component of living heritage that has been subsumed and/or modified by the tourism industries for socio-economic purposes. Négrier and Jourda (2007) attribute their rapid development between the years 1975 and 2000 to a plurality of causes, such as the evolution of democratic regimes and the decentralisation of power. This intimation connecting them to politics creates another dimension to the festival studies of countries in the global south. It specifically relates to African nations as the majority of them are former colonies, which experienced drastic changes in power matrices. This former colonial experience means that once an element is viewed from a different imperial perspective, there is a need for a change of lenses. Although festivals can be traced back to all civilisations including African ones, they have largely been taken to be a Western concept (Fjell, 2007). Typical examples would be Mardi Gras, which is celebrated in New Orleans, USA and Cannes Brulees/ Canboulay Carnival in Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, the Western adaptations and requirements have become the yardstick for all festivals, regardless of environment (see Sahu & Mahanta, 2009; Popescu & Corbos, 2012; Cudny, 2014; Ogbenika, 2020).

The need for diversification of the tourism product has seen it subsume the cultural industry. Aspects of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) are now major components of the industry through a process termed 'festivalisation'. Négrier and Jourda (2007) describe the process as the commercialisation of regular, cultural offerings into the now pervasive festival. Van Elderen (1997, p.126) has previously described it as the 'symbolic transformation of public space to a particular form of cultural

consumption' Festivalisation benefits include cultural preservation, employment and development of small businesses, infrastructure and superstructure development all leading to livelihood improvement of host communities in the festival's locality. Countries in the global north have long since festivalised various aspects of their cultures. Consequently, these countries have a plethora of world-renowned festivals that boost tourism and contribute significantly to the destinations' economic growth. Examples of such successful festivals are the Rio Carnival in Brazil's Rio de Janeiro and the Oktoberfest in Munich, Germany (Lopez, 2020).

The rapid development of these events has created a dimension known as a 'festivalscape'. The festivalscape is generally perceived as the environment surrounding the festival in its entirety (Lee, 2008; Gration *et al*., 2011). Gration, Arcodia, Raciti, and Stokes (2011:344) depict a scape as 'the framework within which a scene can be viewed'. This allusion gives the sense that, the view of a scene, is of critical importance as it determines the framework of its existence. In this case, the view of African festival development indicates that the region seems to be lagging in all spheres (UNESCO, 2015; Tichaawa & Makoni, 2018). To date, the African festivalscape has not been viewed from the perspective of African-ness. In view of the continent's colonial legacy, it is in a way construed in the same vein as its former colonialists. This necessitates a deconstruction of the festivals through the process of decolonisation.

As the festival industry gains global importance, it is essential for studies surrounding them to assume different tangents. UNESCO Festival Statistics (2015) reports a dearth of festival research from Africa, a region with a very high concentration of former colonies. Furthermore, festival scholars are of the general consensus that work in the area of festivals as a discipline is still in its infancy, thus, further conceptual studies are required to advance the development of theory (Getz, 2008; Wilson *et al*., 2017; Laing, 2018). Wilson *et al.,*'s (2017) study recommends the use of concepts and theories from more established social sciences to bolster the building of new theories in the area of festivals. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to contribute to the festival theory by conceptualising the disparity of the African festivalscape, consequently, highlighting the need for decolonising the field to advance African festival development.

Research Aim

This review seeks to explore the African festivalscape from the perspective of decoloniality. The article is structured in four parts. The first introduces the study, while the second part puts the element of decolonising the festivalscape into focus by conceptualising coloniality and decoloniality in terms of festivals. The third part presents an overview of the African festivalscape and the final section prescribes insights on the transformation of the African festivalscape through decoloniality. This study is based on the analysis of content from both empirical and grey literature.

Coloniality and Decoloniality

The festivalscape, though a terrain being explored from numerous perspectives, has yet to be traversed from the angle of decoloniality. While the discursive dimension of decolonisation, which focuses on the world's apprehension as people construct, deconstruct and reconstruct it, has primarily been applied to education, Mamdani (2016) suggests that it be extended to include broader concerns related to systemic transformation. It is in light of this observation that this study introduces festivals as one of the broader concerns.

Coloniality

To understand coloniality, we must first address its precursor, colonisation. Mumbengegwi, Kazembe and Nyarota (2019) depict colonisation as an altering process to the life of the colonised through the violation of social and cultural norms. It also involves the taking away of the land and political power of the colonised. Khokholkova (2016) asserts that colonial powers regarded themselves as redeemers of sorts and the success of colonisation was a more mental than physical conquest. Thus, colonisation involved taking away the peoples' way of life and replacing them with those of the colonisers. This was done through the denunciation and destruction of the local culture of the colonised. African festivals encapsulated the adherence to traditional religions as well as the values and beliefs of the people through performances, rites and rituals; thus, it was prudent for the colonial master to demonise them through education, Christianity and socialisation. Since the establishment of African festivals was built on every community experience; it had to be replaced (Dankwa, Asare-Kumi & Eshun, 2019). Davids (2019) concurs with the above, indicating the visibility of colonialism in administrative and architectural structures, military occupation, pillaging of resources, dispossession of land and the control of education. Festival celebrations bequeathed important aspects to the societal construct of African people by promoting cultural education. This was through oral traditions and practices such as proverbs, prayer, cultural values embedded in artefacts, language proficiency, interpersonal relationships, religious articles and objects as well as artworks and symbols, thus, rendering a sense of belonging (Dankwa *et al*., 2019).

Coloniality, on the other hand, is a more abstract concept that is not dependent on the extant power matrix. Maldonado-Torres (2007) aptly defines it as established arrangements of supremacy that are a result of colonialism. He posits that these patterns delineate socio-cultural, inter-subjectivity relations, and knowledge production. Maldonado-Torres (2016) further intimates that coloniality endures colonialism as it is sustained through and among other means of literature, benchmarks for academic performance, cultural precedent and cuisine. In this way, it impacts the way people think about themselves, their common sense, their aspirations, and most aspects of contemporary experiences. According to Davids (2019) descendants of colonialism breathe coloniality perpetually. Because this mental subjugation remains, the African

festival depicts major aspects of coloniality. Festival parameters and dimensions such as ownership, structure and content are steeped in coloniality. How then can an African festival grow and be perpetuated when it is not on its own terms? Due to the disequilibrium caused by coloniality, former colonies find themselves borrowing from their colonial masters (Mignolo, 2007). Festivals in developing countries largely exhibit a lack of originality caused by the 'borrowing' from the colonial world and this needs to be addressed. Examples of such festivals include the Afrochella in Ghana (Adutwumwah, 2020), which follows the Cochella (Nevada, USA) template or the National Art Festivals hosted in several African countries, such as Grahamstown, South Africa (Vallabh & Kutsi, 2018) and Livingstone Arts and Culture Festival (LICAF) in Livingstone, Zambia (Gilman, 2020). Under the guise of celebrating their African culture, they follow a Western structure that is designed to attract tourists and boost tourism.

In retrospect, the physical manifestations of colonisation are well articulated and understood as former colonies continue the battle to redress the situation. However, the subtler undertones of coloniality are reflected in a mindset that is carefully and subtly perpetuated by the colonial masters and still lingers (Davids, 2019; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 2016). Through Afrocentrism, Asante (2008), gives an evocative obligation to go back in history to revise the collective text of the African people through the Sankofa ideology (Kissi, 2018). It is in this same vein that Dankwa *et al*., (2019) contend that festivals often accomplish more as they have content that can contribute significantly to the reconstruction of African society. They postulate that festivals can furthermore be effective tools for economic development.

Decoloniality

Decoloniality may be described as the reversal of coloniality. It is a term that is used with reference to the logic, metaphysics, ontology and the matrix of power that was created by the colossal processes and aftershock of colonisation and settler-colonialism. This matrix and its lasting effects, together with the accompanying as well as enduring structures are characterised as coloniality. Put in a more accessible fashion, decoloniality can be defined as a way or avenue for the formerly colonised to re-learn their knowledge that has been pushed aside because of the imposition of Western-cum-colonial epistemologies and has been overlooked, suppressed or condemned by the so-called forces of modernity, settler-colonialism, racial capitalism and the tragedy of the superiority of the white race.

Maldonado-Torres (2016) describes decoloniality as the upset of logic, metaphysics, ontology and matrix of power created by the massive processes and aftermath of colonisation. This school of thought focuses on untangling the production of knowledge from a primarily Eurocentric episteme by offering options for confronting and delinking from the matrix of power rooted in colonialism. It critiques the perceived universality of Western knowledge and in the process, the superiority of Western

culture. This view argues that 'the West' does not have the franchise on knowledge (Mignolo, 2012; Maldonado-Torres, 2016). Decoloniality can further be applied to explain the non-functionality of Western knowledge perspectives on the existence and development of cultural attributes in former colonial countries. It articulates the process by which aspects of African culture such as education or festivals that were ravaged by colonisation go through the deconstruction and reconstruction processes that include other decolonial theories such as Afrocentrism or Afrocentricity. Entities such as festivals may need an Afrocentric perspective to develop to the same magnitude as Western festivals, if not bigger.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) is of the opinion that decoloniality is based on three concepts, namely; coloniality of power; coloniality of knowledge; and coloniality of being. Festivals exude a community's power as contended by Dankwa (2019). Festivals transmit and perpetuate a community's knowledge (Mbalisi, 2021; Dankwa, 2019). Izu (2021) asserts that the festival is not a conveyance of culture, but is a cultural symbol in itself. He notes that cultural norms and values are demonstrated through festivals. Furthermore, festivals embody a community's being. These affirmations demonstrate how festival impacts are considered to be far-reaching in the African settings, influencing kinship, rituals, traditions, livelihoods as well as norms and values (Kuuder, Adongo & Abanga 2012; Dankwa *et al*., 2019; Ogbenika, 2020; Mbalisi, 2021). As such, decoloniality involves re-telling the history of a people from the perspective of the formerly de-humanised. Decoloniality, therefore, entails identifying the festival structures that perpetuate oppression, while also working to shed light on those perspectives that have been devalued by hegemonic systems of Western knowledge and power (Maldonado Torres; 2016). Decoloniality can, therefore, be summed up as a restorative process. Thus, this article attempts to identify the African festival structures that have been debased by colonial knowledge systems and power.

The African Festivalscape

The African festivalscape refers to the environment surrounding the African festival. An examination of the general African landscape shows that it is very different from its Western counterparts. Although globally, festivals have become 'big business' boosting economies, improving socio-cultural aspects of communities and livelihoods, the African sphere is seemingly lagging behind in terms of development. This may be attributed to a misunderstanding of the 'African festival' construct, which is largely symptomatic of a residue of the colonial hangover. This is observed through systems that are still a personification of organisational structures, policies, practices and strategies, lingering from the coloniser (Maldonado-Torres, 2016). Countries like Zimbabwe, for instance, revere copy and paste festivals with colonial intonations (Njerekai, 2016; Chihambakwe, 2017). Their events are more concerned with performing for the tourist from the traditional European source markets (colonial

master) than for the locals, thus, the country's failure to maximise the festivalisation of its own cultures.

Some African festival scholars (Mbalisi, 2021; Izu, 2021; Kuuder *et al*., 2012; Dankwa *et al*., 2019; Ogbenika, 2020; Daka *et al*., 2021) posit that the concept of festivals in the African context is deeply enshrined in cultural and social relations. African festivals have spiritual subtexts that are bequeathed from their origins. Festivals in Africa were initially hinged on the community's common characteristic traits and were staged to satisfy specific communal purposes such as, harvest, initiation, commemoration, thanksgiving and entertainment. In that way, African festivals were primarily for cohesive purposes offering a sense of belonging to religious, social, or geographical groups. For instance, some Zambian festivals are ethnic-based and cannot be said to be national in character (Yoshida, 2022; Daka, 2021), thus are originally and primarily for the immediate community. The secondary objective was for disciplinary purposes; religious customs shared through festival activities contributed to the control and a definitive community moral compass. The provision of entertainment for local communities though critical, was a tertiary aspect as this was before the advent of mass-produced entertainment, but it still served to entrench the teachings embedded in the moral thread in the festivals (Ogbenika, 2020). Bonye (2011) underscores this by stating that traditionally, the role of the festival was for the preservation and safeguarding of culture, noteworthy worship of local deities and thanksgiving to ancestors (Dodo, 2016).

Kuuder *et al*., (2012) portray festivals as seasonal occasions. They are recurring and are usually set according to local cultural calendars. In the African context, festivals are used to mark time, for example, harvest, coming of age and to celebrate the new or full moon. An example is Zimbabwe's 'Jenaguru' or full moon festival, which marks the time when the moon is brightest before the planting season or Zambia's 'Kuomboka' that marks the period when the flood plains are immersed in water in the rainy season when the Lozi community moves to higher ground together with their King, the Litunga (Flint, 2016).

Ogbenika (2020) posits that the African festival has a focus on ethnic information and the cultural education of community members thus, perpetuating their traditions and providing a means for unity among families. He further emphasises the importance and involvement of elders in sharing stories and experiences, reciting of tribal history and reaffirmation of values that are cherished by the community.

In African culture, elders are generally revered as cultural custodians who provide standards and a moral compass for the younger generations (Mbalisi, 2021). Baet (2015) contends that modern festivities have been commoditised, corrupted and are in-organic. In this day and age, African festivals can occur disregarding community elders due to politics or religion (Clarke-Ekong, 1997). For example, in the marriage festivities (roora/lobola/umabo/chimalo/magadi) when young people are carrying out the proceedings, you find the church clergy being given centre stage. This has made the African marriage festival un-African and left it open to

exploitation by societal misfits under the guise of economic, social or religious deliverance (Ogbenika, 2020).

Mbalisi (2021;76) brings out another dimension of African festivals as relational. He describes festivals in the context of the 'kinship between people and their proximate neighbours'. Her mention of groupings and immediate neighbours indicates that the 'host community' concept was always extant within the African festival construct. It demonstrates how festival impacts are considered to be far-reaching in the African setting. Mbalisi (2021) and Ogbenika (2020) who carried out separate studies on different traditional Nigerian festivals agree on the 'relational' and 'cohesive' nature of African festivals. Both scholars contend that a major defining feature is that African festivals draw from the pluralistic experience of the African person. There are several ethnicities in Africa with Nigeria alone having more than 250 ethnic groups (Agaba & Orngu, 2016); some are similar and others are very different. Thus, the sum of one's experience is multifaceted as they may be a product of multiple cultures or have assimilated other cultures through intermarriage or spatial interactions. This has a major influence on the African festival programme. Activities such as storytelling, drumming, dancing, singing, masquerades, theatrics, drinking and eating, form the basis of most African cultural festivals across the continent (see ARIPO, 2019; Drammeh & Andersson, 2019). All these activities are dependent on geography and ritualistic beliefs. While modern festivals focus on a plethora of elements such as ambience, theme, design, special effects and audience, the African festival focus was on food and ritual performances. These determined the theme, ambience, the audience and the design.

The consumption of food and drink at African festivals is ritualistic in itself. The production, process, preparation, service and consumption of food at the festivals may be the centre of activities (for example, see Mbalisi, 2021; Ogbenika, 2020; Drammeh & Andersson, 2019). One good example could be that Zimbabweans have a Shona proverb 'Ukama igasva, hunozadziswa nekudya' (Muchinei & Hebert, 2018; Kudejira, 2021) meaning 'Relationships are half full, they are complimented by sharing food to build and sustain them'. What this means is that food and beverages are important connecters in building and sustaining relationships. Kudejira (2021) uses the proverb to describe food as a mediator for mutual social and cultural exchanges. Thus, one of the roles of food at African festivals is to provide a platform for fellowship, a concept modern society calls networking. Coloniality distorted all this; festivals are now often slotted during tourism slumps or at the convenience of international tourists. Consequently, due to the festivalisation that has substituted indigenous and traditional culture with global popular culture, the transition from social gatherings has been commercialised and, in some instances, taken on 'un-African' forms mainly for the enjoyment of attendees who are largely outsiders. These, in some ways, are made to enjoy adulterated versions of African cultural practices, that are packaged as genuine, and because of the love of the exotic, most imbibers of these festivals retain a distorted image of what is African (Huang & Weaver-Hightower,2019).

Coloniality in African festivals can further be noted in the neo-colonialism of the festivalscape. This is largely depicted by a substitution of indigenous, traditional culture through globalised, popular culture, and the transition from 'ritual' to 'spectacle'. This development is clearly related to the increasing competitive festival environment as countries strive to attract consumptive travellers (Pugh & Wood, 2005). Gotham (2002) emphasises that festivals have become commodities that tourism agencies manipulate through marketing promotions. This has led to the festival industry producing events that are aimed at attendees from traditional tourism source markets, detracting from the original festival objectives and alienating the local communities. Traditional tourism source markets are usually the former colonial masters who are credited with developing the tourist markets as they travelled back and forth, from their homes to their colonies. These markets include European countries such as France, Spain, England and Portugal or those directly linked such as the United States of America and Australia (born out of the British Empire). More recently, the continent has been courting Asians and Africans in the Diaspora. Language, place and food are often adjusted to suit the targeted audience while ritual activities that are deemed unsuitable by the courted audience are omitted or banned from the festivals (Daka *et al.*, 2021). In this way, Africans have been inadvertently creating festivals for the global north entailing the suppression of their true objectives to accentuate inherited European ideals and prerequisites.

Determinants of Festival Growth

The global festivalscape consists of several growth determinants that can be broken down into two parts, namely; parameters and dimensions. Parameters are limitations or deterrents to growth or development, while dimensions are the prerequisite boundaries or confines within which a festival will survive, grow or develop well. According to Getz *et al*., (2010) frameworks for comparative and cross-cultural festival management variables include aspects such as; ownership, content, location, attendees and funding of festivals. However, a perusal of the African festivalscape indicates that there can be more as shown in Table 1.4 below:

Table 1: Festival Determinants Based on the Zimbabwean Festivalscape

Determinant	Parameter	Dimensions	Description
Structure and Composition	Non-community stakeholders gender bureaucracy	Community ownership partnerships	The festival is composed of the administrative structure which includes ownership, stakeholders, organisational structure and constitution
Objective	Poor fit	Continuous transmission reproduction, cultural preservation	The objective is the main purpose of the festival, which will lend to the contextualisation of the event
Scope	Festival content	Theme genre programming	The scope covers the typology, genre, size, and content of the festival
Funding	Costs sponsorship commodification	Bursary, grant, sponsorship, investments	Funding refers to the financial resources available for the festival through partnerships, sponsorship, donations, investments, grants, fundraisers, ticket sales and merchandising
Stakeholder Interactions	Acculturation business exchange	Education segmentation/ attendees	Beneficiaries, participation, engagement, involvement and contribution of resources
Resources	Resource dependency	Infrastructure human resources knowledge	Resources are the available means that are inputted into the festival to ensure its success. While these can be financial or non-financial, focus is on the non-financial resources because those of a financial nature are covered in funding. Examples are human resources, equipment, props, festival materials as well as infra and superstructure

Aesthetic Value	Poor design	Good ambience and packaging	Aesthetic value of a festival is truly undermined. The visuals of the event are what lures attendees or gives meaning to the intangibles. For example, décor, design, dressing, packaging, merchandise, advertising and promotion
Time	Poor timing inconsistency poor programming	Seasonality	Time subsumes issues of seasonality, which is when the festival is staged; the frequency, which is how often it is done; duration, how long it lasts as well as the actual timing of the event as per the modern clock. It also covers the preparation timeframe. Time can also be considered a very important festival resource
Environment	Climate change economy politics coloniality pandemics and epidemics	Technology politics	This is the sphere in which the festival is developed and operates in. Aspects of the environment include; politics, technology, economy, culture, climate change, pandemics and epidemics
Perceptions	Beliefs image	Culture beliefs	These are insights on festivals gleaned from observations. These are often shaped by background, expectations or experience. Culture and beliefs manifest perceptions. These perceptions form an image of the festival

Source: Authors' compilation

The structure and composition of a festival is very important. It determines who the stakeholders are and how the festival should be governed. The composition indicates whether the festival should include community members or outsiders; issues of gender

balance and expertise in the particular area of the festivals are also significant. The structure will affect the stakeholder interactions as well as issues of beneficiaries' levels of participation, how stakeholders are engaged and the different levels of involvement. The festival objective is a key driver that will contextualise the event and determine the scope, funding and resources. Its aesthetics influence the attendance as visuals lend to the lure of the event. It is important to consider the environment in which the festival is occurring because it is necessary to adapt the event to the particular situation. It is equally critical to note how stakeholders perceive a festival as it may be necessary to alter their perceptions of certain aspects that may hinder festival development. Lastly, time is a very broad determinant, it not only covers when but also the timeframes involved with the preparations, staging and closure. Dimensions and parameters need to be explored within the African context because to date, the festivals we have inherited have been developed using colonial systems and some are even by non-Zimbabweans like the Harare International Festival of the Arts (HIFA) and LICAF in Livingstone, Zambia that all appear to be European festivals in Africa.

Transformation of the African Festivalscape

Maldonado-Torres (2016) asserts that coloniality divides the world into zones; the global south being the zone that needs to be 'developed' in many ways. Therefore, the African festivalscape may be in need of some 'unmaking' and 'remaking', to transform it into an entity that is relatable to its environments. Several Western festivals based on their local culture have grown to become hallmark events. Hallmark events are those that are identified with the very essence of a place and its host community. These events become synonymous with the name of the place, and gain widespread recognition and awareness for the destination (Oklobdžija & Müller, 2015). While different scholars have varying definitions of hallmark events, the general consensus points to the aspects of programme quality, identification with the host community's culture, tradition and pride, an inextricable link between event and location, increasing destination appeal as well as increasing profitability for all stakeholders (O'Toole, 2015; Getz, 2005; Getz, 2012; Hall 1989, Oklobdžija & Müller, 2015). Quinn (2009) further defines hallmark events as major, one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance destination awareness. They are of special importance both for participants and visitors, as they have proved to be successful in attracting great public attention, thus, contributing to the image of the destination. The hallmark category can be considered to be the ceiling level of growth for festivals.

Hallmark events may also facilitate the maintenance and revitalisation of an area's tradition. These events have also been associated with earning vast tourist revenues and international recognition lending to their popularity with tourism practitioners. An example is the Oktoberfest held annually in Munich, Germany. It is premised on the German Bavarian culture; it has no colonial intonations and is highly successful. The German Bavarian community runs it, to celebrate who they are, attracting tourists and

making money (Jaeger & Mykeltum, 2012; Getz, Svenson, Peterssen & Gunnervall, 2012). Popescu and Corboş (2012) posit that the Oktoberfest attracts more than six (6) million attendees (72% from Bavaria, 13% from the rest of Germany, and 15% are foreign tourists, mainly from Europe, USA, Australia and New Zealand). This is a far cry from the African festival that still tries to duplicate the European festivalscape. An example is Zimbabwe's' trend of copy-pasting events (Njerekai, 2016). The Zimbabwean Government did well in introducing a Tourism Event Strategy in 2010 (Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, 2014). However, its implementation saw the duplication of foreign festival constructs. An example is the Harare International Carnival, which even headlined Cuban Samba girls and Trinidad tin bands. This incensed the Zimbabwean local communities and did not attract any international or domestic tourists (see Zhangazha, 2014; Chihambakwe, 2017). Furthermore, the Zimbabwean festivalscape is characterised by several music festivals such as Unplugged that attempted to copy the Western music festivals such as Glastonbury (United Kingdom) and Coachella (USA). How can these African festivals be unmade and remade? To use a metaphor coined by the late Bob Marley in his 1980 hit 'Redemption Song', the African festivalscape needs to be 'emancipated from mental slavery'.

The process of remaking involves going back to the foundation of the festival to check for structural soundness. To transform the African festivalscape, first and foremost, it is necessary to desist from the duplication of Western festivals. In the same way, the education systems in Africa are being restructured according to the milieu, festivals must undergo a remaking process. Secondly, it is important to identify the determinants for festival growth in the particular African environment. While some African environments can be similar, there are differences that should be taken into account; for example, the political climates, economies and cultures, as these have a large bearing on festival outcomes (Popescu & Corbos, 2012; Wilson *et al.*, 2016). Efforts must be made to accentuate the dimensions that allow for optimum festival growth such as defined ownership structures, strategic partnerships and sound policies. Ideally, for the African festival, ownership must lie with the community. The parameters must be deflected as these may lead to poor festival growth, stagnancy or cessation. Great attention should be paid to parameters such as gender. Festival structures generally sideline women; most of these events do not involve them, yet several African cultures were matriarchal until colonisation when females became 'minors' (Chengu, 2015). Women were decision-makers, holding positions such as queens, chiefs, regents and generals. Even in modern society, the buy-in of women will sway the family decision (Alshammari *et al*., 2019). In the African festival construct, women played major roles, an example is Zimbabwe, where elderly women, young girls and mothers played the roles of consultants, conveners, carried out ceremonial rites, prepared the stage, food, beverage and ambience. In addition, even without documentation, women were the institutional memory of the community's festivals.

Another major parameter that must be addressed is that of resource dependency. The African festival is plagued by the 'donor mentality'. The advent of non-government

organisations (NGO) has led the African people to be complacent and wait for aid for most things including festivals. This has perpetuated a beggar mentality where festivals are run on hand-outs. The African festival was self-sufficient, with the communities supplying all the required resources. Ogbenika (2020) bemoans the exploitation of African communities under the guise of economic assistance. Governments should be encouraged to support community festival initiatives through policy implementation and funding, to protect their people. The objectives of the African festival have been marred by the need for profitability at the expense of the community. Festivals are mushrooming in the Zimbabwean environment for strictly monetary purposes. This also raises concerns over another parameter, commodification. Festivalisation exposes and exploits culture. As a result, value and meaning may be lost through staging and loss of authenticity as performers attempt to eke a living African (Huang & Weaver-Hightower, 2019). The staged performances at festivals cease to be about the community as they are more about entertaining the tourist (colonial master). Anything that the people have been indoctrinated by colonisation to consider pagan or disdained by the masters will not be showcased. This contributes to the sustenance of local festivals as part of the aping culture that has gripped the formerly colonised.

Parameters such as pandemics and epidemics are a relatively new phenomenon to the African festivalscape. Like terrorism, the aforementioned are Western constructs, which due to globalisation, the African festivalscape must contend with. Drought and disease, which are indeed features of the African festival milieu were a basis for festivals such as mukwerera (rain requesting ceremony) and mafuwe (festivities) in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, people's cultures and religious beliefs must be taken into account as this can be a major deterrent to festival development. The advent and perpetuation of Christianity in Zimbabwe has seen several local festive practices perceived as profane and rejected.

Conclusion

The objective of this article was to conceptualise the disparity of the African festivalscape highlighting the need to decolonise and transform the arena to level the playing field. The study's exploration of the African festivalscape reflects a strong residue of colonial hangover. It is evident that the current African festivalscape was created using a colonial template, thus the design is for Western attendees. The review further denotes that African festival dimensions and parameters are largely defined by the colonial legacy in terms of ownership, content, scope, attendees and stakeholder interactions. Insights for festival development opportunities that may arise from the decoloniality of the African festivalscape have also not yet been fully explored. More importantly, the article set the stage for the application of decoloniality as a theory in the study of festivals. Recommendations for further research include assessing the impacts of coloniality on the festivalscape and the exploration of festival growth from an Afrocentric perspective for specific African countries using a case study approach.

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NOMADIC CHILDREN IN KENYA: EXAMINING THE PLACE OF SOCIAL WORK IN THE CONFLICT-LIVELIHOOD-VULNERABILITY INTERFACE

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Abstract

Nomadic pastoralists of Kenya occupy the drylands of the country that make up roughly 80 per cent of the total land area. The defining attributes of these areas include soil moisture deficiency, ethnic conflict and food insecurity. Nomadic pastoralism, the local mainstay is challenged by the cross-pollination of environmental vagrancy, ethnic conflict and poor social services. This subjects children to perennial mobility in the rangelands and, hence, hard-to-reach with social services. The migration increases children's vulnerability and exposes them to conditions that are counterproductive to their growth and development. Consequently, the children are unable to access quality social services including water, health, education and food. This increases their vulnerability to different shocks due to the relative deprivation occasioned by the apparent conspiracy of the social and natural environments. This article uses secondary data to understand the nexus between conflict, livelihood and vulnerability, and the place of social work in the nomadic children of Kenya,and its implications on nomadic children. We conclude that conflict and nomadic pastoralism combine to expose nomadic children to numerous adversities. Henceforth, we recommend social work intervention to moderate nomadic children's vulnerability and augment their welfare.

Keywords: Children, Conflict, Livelihood, Nomadic Pastoralism, Vulnerability

The Nomadic Pastoralists of Kenya

The nomadic pastoralists of Kenya comprise about 30 per cent of the country's total population of about 47 million people but inhabit a larger proportion of the country's land mass. They are mainly of Nilotic and Cushitic ethnic origin including Somali, Borana, Orma, Wardei, Turkana and the Maasai. While they are largely nomadic, some segments of these communities are tending towards sedentarisation and diversification of livelihood as coping mechanisms. This is a function of population pressure, climate change and encroachment of the rangelands by the largely agricultural communities.

The principal occupation of the nomadic pastoralists is livestock husbandry and so, they keep large herds of cattle, goats and sheep. The livestock have deep-rooted socio-cultural and economic values and hence, the nomads' over-dependence and quasi-religious attachment to them (Kona, 1999; Omosa, 2005). Consequently, the pastoral nomads are in constant conflict as they engage in cattle raids or conflicts

over water and pasture for their livestock. The scarcity of water and pasture represents deprivation that strains their relationships not only between them and the government but also with other neighbouring communities.

It is pointed out that cattle raid that was once a traditional sporting activity has since metamorphosed into an illegal commercial venture, especially with the entry of the gun (Kona, 1999; Odegi-Awuondo, Namai & Mutsotso, 1994; Osamba, 1999). In such circumstances, children are subjected to violence; others may be maimed, orphaned or sexually assaulted by combatants. It is noted that firearms can easily be found in the country, thanks to unstable neighbouring countries reinforced by international border porosity. For example, Somalia that borders Kenya along the drylands, has had civil war and without a viable central government since 1991 courtesy of a *coup de tat*. Along Kenya's international border with Ethiopia and Sudan, there are heavily armed communities that have for years maintained frosty relationships with their respective governments. This has seen cross-border migration and trafficking of arms and ammunition to the deterioration of security in the drylands of Kenya.

In addition, North Western Uganda that borders Kenya is another volatile region inhabited by heavily harmed communities on both sides of the border, the Pokot and Karamajong nomadic pastoralists of Kenya and Uganda, respectively (Osamba, 1999). Hence, given that these communities have nomadic pastoralism as their livelihood, there is always tension that translates into armed conflict over natural wherewithal and livestock. The resultant cross-border conflict has been more or less the governance archetype in these areas. Indeed, the larger Karamoja area on the Kenya-Uganda border suffers from a combination of climate change, cross-border migration and conflict (UN, 2014).

The foregoing has heightened human insecurity and poverty indices that are comparatively higher than the other areas of the country (KNBS & SID, 2013; UN, 2014). A state of human insecurity results in general community-wide deprivation that makes the lives of children most unrewarding and more precarious. The resultant deprivation leads to strain in society that may be manifested in the form of deep-seated feeling of injustice and at worst, violence. It is worse for children, especially when they are withdrawn from school to accompany their parents to safer areas when violence becomes unbearable (Omosa, 2005). Worse still, others may be recruited into combatants or combatants' wives, where they may lose their lives (Save the Children, 2005).

Some of the nomadic pastoralists have cultural practices that stand in the way of children's self-actualisation. For example, while Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is rampant as a rite of passage among some Kenyan communities, forced early marriages come in to compound the ability of the girl child to make a choice for her own benefit (Mwenzwa, 2014; Mwenzwa & Masese, 2011; Mwenzwa & Onduru, 2011). These practices are detrimental to children while impeding development in a major way. For example, low literacy rates mean lowly compensated economic

engagements, which leads to a vicious cycle of poverty, which partly explains high poverty indices among dryland resident communities.

Children who are born and grow up in the foregoing circumstances start life from a great disadvantage. This increases their vulnerability to natural and anthropogenic shocks including drought, famine, conflict, floods and diseases. In general, the dryland context itself is challenging, with a highly mobile population, poor infrastructure, vast distances between schools and other public amenities, which are compounded by snail-paced change of negative cultural practices (Republic of Kenya, 2009). In addition, community participation in education is limited, poverty levels are high and learners with special needs face stigma, isolation and discrimination (Mwenzwa, 2014)

Moreover, child labour, in many cases in its worst forms in ASALs of Kenya, is also a challenge (Mwenzwa & Masese, 2011; Mwenzwa, 2013). As such, while there are various opportunities to meet the needs of the nomadic children, the challenges seem overwhelming. The foregoing demonstrates relative deprivation as far as the nomadic pastoralists are concerned. This points to possible social strain in society, putting the poor, elderly and children in relatively more disadvantaged positions.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Essentially, every human endeavour has a theoretical grounding including nomadic children of Kenya's vulnerability amid conflict and shaky livelihood. This chapter was guided by two theoretical frameworks, the structural strain and relative deprivation. Robert Merton developed the Structural Strain theory as an extension of the functional perspective on normlessness (Abraham, 1982). This theory traces the origins of normlessness and deviance to the tensions that are caused by the gap between cultural goals and the means available to people for attaining the goals (Abraham, 1982; McLauhlin, Muncie & Hughes, 2003; Watts, Bessant & Hil, 2008).

According to the Structural Strain Theory, culture establishes goals for people in society while social structure provides (or fails to provide) the means for people to achieve those goals. In a well-integrated society, people use accepted and appropriate means to achieve the goals that society establishes, in which case, the goals and the means of the society are in balance (McLauhlin, Muncie & Hughes, 2003; Watts, Bessant & Hil, 2008). It is when the goals and means are not in balance with each other that anomie is likely to occur. This imbalance between cultural goals and structurally available means can lead an individual into deviant behaviour such as engagement in armed ethnic conflict. This is the case in the arid areas of Kenya that are principally inhabited by nomadic pastoralists.

In these areas, there are goals to be achieved yet the means of achieving them are not available to some people. In this case, it is important that the nomadic pastoralists are facilitated to achieve self-actualisation like other communities through the provision of quality social services. However, these are hardly available in qualities that ensure human security. As such, these conditions bring strain to society as people compete

over the few resources and opportunities available. Many times, the competition leads to inter and intra-community strain manifested in the form of competition and conflict. In such circumstances, some people are disproportionately affected including children.

In these circumstances, some people not only reject both the established cultural goals and the accepted means of attaining them, but they go further and substitute them with new ones. These are likely to lead to conflict as such people rebel against the society, which defines nomadic pastoralists in Kenya who remain highly armed not only to defend themselves against neighbouring communities but also against security personnel. The foregoing speaks to Relative Deprivation Theory, a recognition and associated feeling that one is deprived with respect to some comparative dimension such as economic welfare (Seepersad, 2009; Saleh, 2012; Tropp & Wright, 1999). Such discrimination may lead to feelings of injustice and frustration, and hence, conflict. A look at social service provision in the drylands of Kenya compared to the high potential areas depicts glaring inequalities, that fertilise the ground for possible violence against authorities in the former.

Relative Deprivation Theory can explain outcomes such as collective destructive behaviour, negative ethnicity and attitudes toward authorities (Seepersad, 2009). Hence, the rebellion and militancy observed among many nomadic pastoralist communities in Kenya can partly be explained. For Saleh (2012), where minorities experience inequalities as opposed to other ethnic groups, ethnic conflict is quite likely. This is because feelings of deprivation imply a sense of entitlement among the disadvantaged in that they feel they deserve the privileges that others have (Tropp & Wright, 1999). The actual failure to get what one thinks is their entitlement becomes a recipe for possible violence.

As literature including government documents attests, the infrastructure for education, health, roads and security that is provided to nomadic pastoralists of Kenya leaves a lot to be desired as shown in Table 1 and 2, compared to those in Table 4. These indices are likely to implant in the nomadic pastoralists an aggressive attitude towards authorities and hence, open rebellion and violence against neighbours and the government. A case in point is the 10 November 2012 incident in which over forty (40) security officers were killed by bandits in the Baragoi area within Samburu County (Mwenzwa, 2015). Such conflict impacts negatively on local tranquility and, therefore, increasing children's vulnerability.

Materials and Methods

This chapter is the result of a study that involved the analysis of secondary data which aimed at bringing to the fore the interface of conflict, livelihood and nomadic children vulnerability. The latter is associated with livelihood, political ecology and spatial analysis (Matyas & Pelling, 2012). In particular, data from both the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and the Commission for Revenue Allocation (CRA) was relied upon based on the fact that it was recent and coming immediately

after the promulgation of a new constitutional dispensation in Kenya, in 2010. The chapter has, therefore, employed textual and content analysis of literature to discern meaning and implications of the utilised secondary data and concluded that the vulnerability of the nomadic children of Kenya is increased by both natural and anthropogenic activities including conflict, aridity and scarcity of natural wherewithal.

The data that was principally relied on was collected in 2014 from the local people by government agencies: the KNBS and the CRA. The tests were subjected to content analysis to determine who said what, to whom and why. Such analysis was particularly important for determining the message's reliability and validity and making inferences from a position of information. In addition, literature was subjected to textual analysis to determine the competence of the writers in terms of their standing and believability in addition to their positions and roles in society. The documents were determined to have been written by authors versed in the subject matter who exhibited the professionalism required of academic work. As government agencies, the expectation is that the data depict the true state of affairs of the concerned communities.

Findings

The study aimed at doing an exposition through the analysis of secondary data and understand the interconnectedness between conflict, livelihood and the vulnerability of children in the drylands of Kenya and how social work practice could intervene. From the analysis, two themes have emerged: children, nomadic lifestyle and conflict on one hand and; children's vulnerability in the drylands of Kenya.On the other hand, these themes point to the fact that on one hand when conflict affects livelihood in the form of livestock husbandry, nomadic communities are adversely affected in various ways. This may necessitate self-defence strategies and migration to safer areas, which increases children's vulnerability and heightens human insecurity. A look at the emergent themes is important to bring out the understanding of the interface between conflict, livelihood and children vulnerability nexus in the drylands of Kenya. It is the exposition of the interface that informs conclusions and attendant recommendations for social work intervention going forward.

Children and Nomadic Lifestyle: Conflict, Livelihood and Vulnerability Nexus

Children, Nomadic Lifestyle and Conflict

While children in general, form a vulnerable segment in society (Githinji, 2009), this vulnerability differs across time and space. For the Kenyan nomadic child, the current policies,despite their good intentions, remain ineffective in meeting children's needs in appreciable proportions (Omosa, 2005; Suda, 2003). While some of the policies and laws are somehow out of touch with the needs of the nomadic child, others are unviable in the circumstances in which nomadic children live (Mwenzwa & Masese, 2011; Omosa, 2005; Odegi-Awuondo, Mutsotso & Namai, 1994; Pkalya, Adan & Masinde, 2003). However, the policy environment has generally improved significantly in recent years,

with free primary and day secondary education and the development of a policy for nomadic education (Republic of Kenya, 2003; 2005b; 2007; 2008; 2009). In addition, the National Special Needs Education Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2010) is yet another pointer to a window of opportunity to meet the needs of the child including those of the nomadic pastoralists. In particular, these children stay in the drylands that are characterised by below standard social services and inadequate resources that are necessary for human well-being. This implies suffering for whole communities and more so, for children.

A look at the Kenyan international borders along the drylands reveals significant cross-border movements of people and livestock throughout the year (Osamba, 1999; UN, 2014; Acacia Consultants, 2011; Pkalya, Adan & Masinde, 2003). As such, when communities interact amid a scarcity of common resources, they are likely to engage in conflict courtesy of resource scarcity. The consequences of such conflict on the communities at large and children in particular, are dire. They may be attacked by other communities and lose their livestock to raiders or disease. In addition, the nomadic lifestyle requires that families have to migrate from time-to-time in search of pasture and water for their livestock. In other times, they are forced to migrate when insecurity is unbearable particularly when invaded by cattle raiders from neighboring communities and across the border. In the North-Eastern Region, this has been heightened by the infiltration of the Al Shabaab militants from Somalia, who not only attack locals but also security personnel and the public at large. A case in point is the Garissa University terrorist attack in Garissa Town on 2 April 2015 that left 148 fatalities.

In addition, the recurring drought cycles within the larger Karamoja area lead to heightened out-migration of pastoralists across the Kenya-Uganda border in search of water and pasture. This tends to increase the contact between pastoralists in cattle grazing and watering points, a principal recipe for cross-border conflict (Sheekh, Atta-Asamoah & Sharamo, 2012; UN, 2014). Sometimes, when conflict combines with weak child protection policies, they expose them to untold vulnerabilities not just regarding basic needs but importantly, their survival. This is especially true when they have to migrate together with their parents to safe havens or transit camps as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Omosa, 2005; Suda, 2003; UN, 2014).

Vulnerability is conceptualised as the risk of adverse outcomes such as poverty, ill-health, social marginalisation, poor educational attainment, starvation, malnutrition, insecurity and the possibility of harm among other issues. It is increased by the inability of those affected to withstand the impacts. This may be a function of among others, the availability of resources, resilience capacity and climatic conditions, and in the context of children, it is compounded by their inability to cope unassisted (Leach, 2007). While children's vulnerability is increased by the unavailability of resources, the social and physical environment in which they live does not provide them with appropriate safety nets. The foregoing has the potential to result in imbalanced child physical, social and moral development. Hence, children

and adolescents remain vulnerable due to their age and the fact that their provisioning and social protection against shocks is dependent on adults (Chiwaka & Yates, 2003).

The foregoing may produce short or long-term negative impacts on families, necessitating intervention of social work nature. For example, flooding may be a physical environmental shock that may have short-term impacts on people's lives including temporary loss of dwelling. On their part, war and conflict could be seen as long-term political shocks whose impacts may be felt far and wide including an impact on the economy. A case in point regarding the foregoing is that conflict in South Sudan and Somalia is partly responsible for incidences of terrorism and armed robbery in Kenya, due to the smuggling of arms and ammunition (Omosa, 2005; Murunga, 2005; Mwenzwa, 2013). Generally, the disabling impact of conflict means increased vulnerability amid runaway poverty and other development indices. Children caught in such conflict are expected to be affected more disproportionately than adults.

As a result, such children may be harmed or orphaned, leaving in them an indelible psychological trauma. At the very worst, they end up losing their lives. In addition, this may be compounded by inadequate access to basic social services including food, education, health, water and security. Indeed, education and health care may be seen as luxuries that the children have to do without. This results in a vicious cycle of poverty in which children, women and the aged are likely to be more affected (IBRC, 2010; Mwenzwa & Masese, 2011; IFRC, 2010; Idris, 2011). Such deprived circumstances may lead to inter-generational poverty transfer.

Nomadic pastoralists particularly those in the areas popularly known as Northern Kenya are among the poorest, marginalised and most deprived people in the country (Sheekh, Atta-Asamoah & Sharamo, 2012). This situation is compounded by the cross-pollination of both natural and anthropogenic activities in the form of weather variability, unreliability and unpredictability in the midst of ethnic conflict and cattle theft. The combination of water and pasture scarcity in the midst of armed conflict leads to heightened risk of harm, food insecurity and malnutrition in these areas (UNICEF, 2011). Children caught up in such circumstances are left at the mercy of nature and raiders, and the consequences are dire. This is more so, when they are orphaned and left alone in transit camps (Acacia Consultants, 2011; Pkalya, Adan & Masinde, 2003), where they may be attacked, face malnutrition and starvation, especially when conflict dissuades relief supplies.

Nomadic pastoralism implies the inability to access social services such as education and health. Indeed, Idris (2011) avers that while nomadic pastoralism amounts to missed educational opportunities, access to education is equal to exit from pastoralism. It is noted that the migration of pastoralists is sometimes not a function of pasture and water, but a result of activities such as invasion by armed gangs. The children's vulnerability that results from missed education and other opportunities is known to lead to high mortality rates and a bleak future for the children. As a result, the deprivation induced by a combination of conflict, migration, weather patterns and food insecurity accentuates the precarious situations nomadic children have to contend with.

Children's Vulnerability in the Drylands of Kenya

Children like other people, have a right to social services including quality health care, safe drinking water, shelter, security, food, education and adequate protection from shocks. However, this is far from reality for children in the drylands of Kenya. Moreover, there are acute gender differentials regarding access to social services with the girl child having to jump over more hurdles to access education (Mwenzwa & Rosana, 2011; Mwenzwa & Onduru, 2011). This disproportionately increases their vulnerability to shocks not only as children but also as adults. While girls may be withdrawn from school and forced into marriage, conflict may come to compound the already bad situation. Boys, on the other hand, may be forced by conflict to drop out of school or voluntarily do so to help fight the enemy (Murunga, 2005; Omosa, 2005; Suda, 2003). These work to their disadvantage as they make them more maladjusted, not only as children but also as adults in the future.

While the institutional framework for the protection of children in Kenya and globally is adequate, its implementation leaves a lot to be desired. It is expected that children are protected from shocks by their families and communities and that the institutional framework only comes to reinforce the foregoing. However, many are not lucky enough to enjoy such protection in appreciable measures, part of the problem being the socio-economic status of their families and the physical environment in which they live. Children's vulnerability gives rise to various socio-economic problems with adverse consequences on their growth and development. The foregoing is better illustrated by alluding to some welfare indicators as shown in Table 1 for the largely arid counties of Kenya.

Table 1: Welfare Indicators for Arid Counties of Kenya

Arid Counties	**Selected Welfare Indicators/Rates (%)**		
	Literacy	**Food poverty**	**Absolute poverty**
Garissa	28.3	42.9	73.4
Mandera	9.6	82.4	87.9
Wajir	8.9	71.9	83.9
Tana River	48.3	54	76.9
Isiolo	35.5	76.5	71.6
Marsabit	4.2	82.5	91.7
Baringo	63.2	59.2	59.8
Samburu	12.5	67.5	73
Turkana	7.3	92	94.4
West Pokot	30.5	60.9	69.4
Average	**24.83**	**68.98**	**78.20**

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2011; CRA, 2011

As shown in Table 1, on average, the arid counties post extremely low literacy rates that explain the high levels of poverty therein. Part of the problem is environmental vagrancy and over-reliance on livestock husbandry. In much of these areas, dryland farming is ruled out and, therefore, elevating livestock to the apex of livelihood activities. Given the weather conditions in these areas, the onset of a dry spell leaves livelihood wobbly, with the consequence of possible poverty traps. Children in such circumstances are, therefore, deprived of multiple needs, which is tantamount to violation of human rights.

Indeed, poverty and illiteracy affect and reinforce one another with devastating effects on children and adults alike. Even after the Government of Kenya started implementing the free primary school education programme in 2003, education indicators in the drylands including enrolment, transition, completion, retention and performance are unimpressive. Such children end up as herders and casual labourers and even worse recruited into armed gangs by cattle rustling warlords and terrorist groups. With the current economic trends in the country, it can safely be concluded that children in such circumstances are disadvantaged given their vulnerability to the impacts of floods, drought, inflation, conflict and famine. This is mainly because their communities are deprived of many-folds, a condition, which strains relationships leading to both intra and inter-ethnic conflict, which makes the lives of nomadic children worse off.

With low levels of literacy as shown in Table 1, the affected are unexpected to have many livelihood alternatives. For example, the modest educational achievement registered among pastoral-nomadic communities cannot allow their children to compete with those from other communities on an equal footing when it comes to securing self-actualising opportunities (Mwenzwa & Rosana, 2011). They are therefore left with the option of engaging in casual and unskilled manual work including child labour, sometimes its worst forms (ILO, 1999; Mwenzwa & Njaramba, 2006). Some of the undertakings they engage in are not only poorly paid but also erratic. Altogether, sustainable livelihood in these areas is more theoretical than practical. There is, however, a slight improvement in the largely semi-arid counties as Table 2 attests.

Table 2: Welfare Indicators for Semi-Arid Counties of Kenya

Semi-Arid Counties	**Selected Welfare Indicators/Rates (%)**		
	Literacy	**Food poverty**	**Absolute poverty**
Kitui	50.9	50.8	63.8
Makueni	69.2	56.4	64.1
Kwale	57.0	71.1	74.9
Taita Taveta	84.2	48.1	57.0
Laikipia	70.1	39.7	50.5
Narok	27.7	28.3	26.7
Kajiado	50.2	11.6	11.6
Average	**58.5**	**43.7**	**49.8**

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2011; CRA, 2011

As shown in Table 2, in the semi-arid counties, there is a slight improvement in the literacy levels that are likely to lead to improvement in welfare indicators including decreased poverty. This implies education has a great role to play in poverty reduction. Table 2 shows that literacy levels are slightly higher than those in the largely arid counties. There is still much more that needs to be done given that poverty levels remain a significant impediment to the realisation of national development (Republic of Kenya, 2007; 2008). With both food and absolute poverty indices about 50 per cent on average, it implies that dependency ratios are high, making access to basic needs largely a mirage. Consequently, access to social services including education for children is a preserve of a few as others remain at the periphery. Nonetheless, in the largely high potential areas of the country, education has a direct impact on poverty alleviation as attested by Table 3.

Table 3: Welfare Indicators for High Potential Counties

High potential Counties	**Selected welfare indicators/rates (%)**		
	Literacy	**Food poverty**	**Absolute poverty**
Kiambu	79.1	25.5	22.5
Meru	50.1	15.7	48.5
Kisii	60.8	51.9	43.9
Kericho	70.6	39.1	42.9
Nandi	71.8	45.7	47.5
Kakamega	55.4	51.7	27.2
Average	**64.6**	**38.3**	**38.8**

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2011; CRA, 2011

Whereas there are differences between the arid, semi-arid and high potentials areas, it is clear that there is a direct relationship between physical environment and human welfare. Literacy increases with decreasing aridity and poverty as the foregoing data attests. For example, weather conditions in the drylands prohibit meaningful agriculture, minimising the opportunities for livelihood diversification (Mwenzwa & Njaramba, 2006). As economic opportunities dwindle, families slide into poverty, making access to education for children more of a luxury than a necessity. The resultant vulnerability makes children and adults alike, destitute.

Weather conditions including drought and El Nino leave a devastating effect on livestock, the predominant livelihood in arid areas to the disadvantage of pastoralists. In addition, cattle theft has had an effect on both livestock loss and human lives. Consequently, natural and anthropogenic events impact negatively on the incomes of the dryland communities. This, in turn, affects children's schooling, health and physical security. In addition, cultural practices in these areas are counterproductive particularly to girl child education, with far-reaching implications on their social development (Wagner, 2015; Mwenzwa & Masese, 2011). Some of the practices imply discontinuation of schooling, and dwindling prospects for self-actualisation.

Shaky livelihood occasioned by the scarcity of natural resources particularly water and pasture is the principal driver of migration and conflict among the nomadic pastoralists. This cross-pollinates with conflict amid low development indices making nomadic pastoralists highly vulnerable to shocks such as floods, drought and human and livestock diseases. The onset of either leaves the nomads at the periphery of society, necessitating social work intervention as follows:
First, relative deprivation is partly responsible for constrained relationships among the communities living in the drylands of Kenya, resulting in conflict with devastating impacts of development as it increases adverse outcomes. As a result, the indigenous institutions of governance must be re-activated and strengthened so that conflict is dealt with at the local level. Social workers need to be equipped to re-activate these institutions to give them a voice in resolving conflicts at the local level. This is expected to reduce the vulnerability of children a great deal. Social workers have an obligation to engage the government and influence its action on cross-border surveillance to reduce the influx of arms and ammunition. Such is expected to minimise cattle raids and armed ethnic conflicts that increase children's vulnerability.

Second, ethnic conflict in the drylands of Kenya is endemic, hence, the need to ease the strained relationships and sustainably prevent ethnic conflict. This requires social workers to collect information regarding local conflict, from which it is expected that they can liaise with the government and other development agencies to develop and deploy conflict early warning systems. Such are expected to help the local populace and government detect conflict before they occur and prevent them. The foregoing is based on the reasoning that response to conflict has largely been reactionary through the deployment of security forces after the fact. This is expected to shield communities in general and children in particular from the adverse consequences of conflict.

Third, in the drylands of Kenya, there are firms that need to scale up their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. In particular, there are cement manufacturing, oil prospecting, salt extracting, coal and limestone mining and power generation firms in these areas. Moreover, government-owned firms in the drylands including Kenya Wildlife Service, Kerio Valley Development Authority, Kenya Energy Generating Company and Geothermal Development Corporation, need to plough some of their profits in CSR activities locally. Social workers should identify local community-felt needs and engage the firms in having the latter scale up of their CSR activities, especially in child protection.

Fourth, in-country and cross-borders, cattle raids are common, and have institutionalised insecurity in the drylands. This has worked to socialise children into armed conflict, graduating from simple combatants into armed warriors and may eventually become cattle rustling lords. Subsequent induction of other children into livestock theft and ethnic conflict implies near-permanent insecurity. Here, social workers have a role to play in breaking this cyclic socialisation into armed conflict. We, therefore, root for a robust social rehabilitation of nomadic

children to guarantee future peace and reduction in children's vulnerability. Social workers should identify the most vulnerable of children and determine their needs followed by their rehabilitation. This is expected to provide the necessary paradigm shift by re-orienting the energies of the children into more constructive activities. The foregoing includes schooling, sports, theatre arts and technical skills.

Fifth, of late the government of Kenya has introduced several social protection schemes including cash transfers to the poor, aged and windows. While this may make some difference in the lives of beneficiaries, this is not sustainable given the state of the economy and the runaway corruption in Kenya. Indeed, it may institutionalise dependency rather than self-reliance. Hence, there is a need for change in the way social protection, especially for children is implemented. It is recommended that social workers engage the government and development agencies to provide nomadic children with education in boarding schools, in areas away from their conflict-prone neighbourhood. This argument stems from the observation that literacy increases with decreasing poverty and vulnerability. Most importantly, educating nomadic children amounts to showing them how to fish instead of giving their parents fish. This becomes an insurance for the future of children to reduce their vulnerability.

Finally, given the importance of appropriate information for facilitating decision-making, there is a need for continuous research to understand the changing nature of nomadic children's needs. Social workers have a duty to influence policy and legislation leading to the establishment of a National Children Research Laboratory in Kenya, specifically meant for research on children. Such an institution can be very important as a resource center for children information in general and nomadic children in particular. The institution can act as a storehouse of data on children so that any intervention is done from a point of information.

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CLIMATE CHANGE EDUCATION IN MALAWI: EXAMINING LEARNERS' KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES TOWARDS LEARNING CLIMATE CHANGE EDUCATION CONTENT IN SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS

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Abstract

In this study, the researchers examined learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices towards learning Climate Change Education (CCE) content in senior secondary schools in Malawi. The mixed method convergent parallel design was employed. Data was collected from 64 participants consisting of learners in 8 secondary schools in two education divisions. Questionnaires and focus group discussions were used to collect data. Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, while qualitative data was analysed thematically. Results indicate that 56.9 per cent of learners had little knowledge of CC. In terms of attitudes, 73.4 per cent agreed that learning CCE content makes them worried about the environment. It was found that an average of 66.9 per cent of the learners did not have a variety of CCE practices for mitigating and adapting to CC. It was recommended that the senior secondary school curriculum should be revised to include CCE content and activities that are likely to promote learning through practice.

Keywords: Climate Change Education, Curriculum, Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices

Introduction

Climate Change (CC) is one of the most threatening global environmental challenges of the 21st century. Barack Obama, the 44th president of the United States of America, once said, 'No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change' (Vaughter, 2016). The former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban-Ki-Moon, also described climate change as a major overriding environmental issue of our time and the single greatest challenge facing decision-makers at many levels of society (United Nations, 2014). Indeed, the 21st century is a time when the whole planet is threatened by human environmental decisions and actions (United Nations, 2014). UNESCO (2015) defined CC as a global phenomenon of climate transformation that is characterised by the changes in the usual climate of the planet regarding temperature, precipitation and wind that are especially caused by human activities.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined CC as a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer (UNFCCC, 2011). The IPCC Working Group I Sixth Assessment

Report released on 6 August 2021 warned that the world surface temperatures could increase by 1.0^0C to 5.0^0C by the end of this century (IPCC, 2021). The anthropogenic activities such as deforestation and industrial activities have led to high production of greenhouse gases that contribute to CC, which creates the most significant challenge to achieve sustainable development (Lynch, Cain and Pierrehumbert, 2021).

In Malawi, it is indisputable that CC is taking place because the evidence can be seen almost everywhere. For instance, Figure 1 shows Rumphi secondary school, which was damaged by strong winds and heavy rainfall in 2017. This disrupted learning at the school because learners could not use the classrooms. The books in the library were completely damaged. Teachers could not teach the learners because they were psychologically affected as their houses were severely damaged.

Figure 1: Rumphi Secondary School Damaged by Strong Winds and Heavy Rainfall in 2017 https://malawi24.com/2017/10/30/strong-winds-destroy-schools-rumphi

In recent years, the Southern Region of Malawi has been more vulnerable to the effects of CC. For instance, Cyclone Idai, in 2019, Cyclone Gombe and Cyclone Ana, in 2022, and Cyclone Freddy, in 2023 seriously affected the Southern Region of Malawi. Infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools and health facilities were severely damaged. The effects of these cyclones have undermined development efforts and most severely affected the poor. Figure 2 shows Zalewa Road in Blantyre District, which was cut by Cyclone Freddy in March 2023. This is just but one of the roads, bridges and infrastructure that were badly damaged.

Figure 2: Zalewa Road in Blantyre District Cut by Cyclone Freddy in March, 2023
Source: Department of Disaster Management Affairs in Malawi (2023)

Since the future of humans depends on the actions that humans themselves take today, UNESCO (2021) pointed out that Climate Change Education (CCE) can be a tool for promoting CC awareness among the learners and all individuals in the communities. Learners are key in this because they are ultimately the future leaders and decision-makers. Therefore, learners who have a high level of knowledge and good attitude towards CCE are likely to develop good practices on sustainable use of resources and help in combating CC (Othman and Mahmud, 2021). Learners who have gained knowledge through CCE are likely to translate what is learnt to other related situations. Rahman, Tasmin, Uddin, Islam and Sujauddin (2014) explained that knowledge of CC may help learners develop a sense of responsibility in managing the environment. Learners can understand better the causes of CC and most likely respond efficiently by solving the local problems that lead to CC. However, Chappin, Bijvoet and Oei (2017) argued that knowledge helps in more sustainable attitudes and behaviours, but it is not a guarantee that people will change habits and behavior based on what they know.

The Focus of Climate Change Education in Malawi

Malawi is a signatory to several international conventions that address CCE and awareness. Consequently, some programmes have been put in place to implement agreed protocols and conventions (Joshua and Namphande, 2014). There has been a lot of effort directed towards CCE and awareness in the country. For instance, the Malawi Institute of Education (2015) developed a CC sourcebook to help in equipping learners with the acquisition of knowledge, attitudes and practices about CC adaptation, mitigation and resilience. The book was developed with support from UN CC: Learn and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Climate change education focuses on the following areas: transformation, mitigation, adaptation and understanding and attentiveness. This is illustrated in the CCE transformation model in Figure 3.



Figure 3: The Transformative Model in Climate Change Education
Source: UNESCO (2020)

As illustrated in Figure 3, CCE emphasises the need for transformation at all levels of society, from individual to institutional, from local to global (UNESCO, 2020). Climate change education can help secondary school learners to understand the driving forces behind CC and create a mindset of alertness to changes that are occurring. Mitigation is another dimension of CCE that learners are supposed to understand. This means doing something to reduce or relieve a situation (UNESCO, 2020). It is about identifying the causes of CC and developing the knowledge, skills, attitudes and practices required for individual and societal change to address the causes. For instance, the root cause of CC is greenhouse gas emissions. At this level, education for CC mitigation may cover the various levels and types of energy consumption, the shift to non-polluting renewable energy sources, energy conservation, environmental conservation, reforestation and afforestation.

The adaptation dimension of CCE relates to building resilience and reducing vulnerability in the face of CC impacts that are already happening or are soon to happen. The learning may be technical, for example, learning about drought-resistant farming practices, or flood management behaviours. It is necessary that learners should learn by doing, so that they can develop better practices for CC adaptation. Climate change education should assist learners to develop knowledge, attitudes and practices in all the dimensions illustrated by the transformative model of CCE in Figure 3. As mentioned in the abstract, this article is based on a study in which researchers examined learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices toward learning CCE content in senior secondary schools in Malawi.

Methodology

A mixed-method convergent parallel design was adopted for this study. The qualitative

and quantitative data were mixed at the interpretation stage and there was an added value in combining them (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2018). In other words, mixing two data sets of the qualitative and quantitative form helped to produce a more complete picture and provided an opportunity for a greater assortment of divergent and complementary views; which were valuable and enriched the understanding of the phenomenon (Dawadi, Shrestha and Giri, 2021).

A sample of 64 learners from 8 schools in Shire Highlands Education Division (SHED) and South West Education Division (SWED) was used. Of the 64 learners, 32 were from 4 schools in SHED in the following districts: Phalombe, Mulanje, Thyolo and Chiradzulu. The other 32 learners were from 4 schools in SWED in the following districts: Blantyre, Mwanza, Chikhwawa and Nsanje. Simple random sampling was used in the selection of 4 schools per educational division. Simple random sampling was also used in the selection of 8 learners per school, specifically at the senior secondary school level. The study used questionnaires and focus group discussions as data collection methods and instruments. Questionnaires were distributed to all the 64 learners in the 8 secondary schools. Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS version 28, while qualitative data was analysed thematically.

Literature Review

This section provides a brief review of related literature about learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices in climate change education.

Learners' Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in Climate Change Education

The international community recognises education as one of the tools for addressing CC. Muchanga and Nakazwe (2015) described education as a right of all individuals and a means of enhancing well-being and quality of life in a changing environment where CC is a big challenge. Nhamo and Shava (2014) explained that CCE helps learners understand and address the impacts of CC, empowering them with the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes needed to act as agents of change. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNCCC), the Paris Agreement and the associated Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) agenda all call on governments to educate, empower and engage all citizens on policies and actions relating to CC (UNESCO, 2021). Stevenson, Nicholls and Whitehouse (2017) proposed that the goal of CCE is to prepare learners for an uncertain future by helping them gain knowledge, skills, dispositions and values that will enable them to deal with future challenges. Othman and Mahmud (2021) explained that learners who have high levels of knowledge, risk perception and good attitudes towards CCE are likely to have good practices about the sustainable use of resources. Learners who have gained knowledge through CCE are likely to realise that the future of the planet is in their hands. In a study that was conducted in Izrael by Seroussi, Rothschild, Kurzbaum and Hemo (2019), it was found that learners' level of knowledge about CC in secondary

schools was low. Both learners and teachers had misunderstandings and gaps in the knowledge of the causes and consequences of CC. They both did not show positive attitudes and behaviours to reduce CC effects. Regarding attitudes with respect to environmentally-friendly behaviour, many learners displayed a lack of willingness to act in an environmentally-friendly way. Similarly, findings in a study by Crayne (2015) in high schools in Western Oregon, in the United States of America, revealed that learners had feelings of fear, sadness, and guilt in response to difficult environmental topics, including CC. Some learners got depressed that the problem of CC was too big to solve. Even some teachers expressed concern about making learners feel bad. However, it is the responsibility of teachers to find better ways of managing learners' emotions when teaching them about CC. Learners should understand that the future of the Earth is in their hands and that they should start taking action to combat CC.

Falaye and Okwilagwe (2016) conducted a study in secondary schools in Nigeria aimed at assessing learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices of CC. The findings revealed that the knowledge of CC was slightly low in learners and the attitude to CC was slightly favourable. To improve learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices in CC mitigation, adaptation and resilience; Falaye and Okwilagwe (2016) suggested that the secondary school curriculum should be revised. It should be designed to assist learners increase knowledge and adopt positive practices as CC affects everybody in the society. Christensen and Knezek (2015) explained that educating learners about CC may help to create responsible citizens who are likely to make informed decisions regarding the environment in the future.

In a study that was conducted by Kutywayo, Chersich, Naidoo, Scorgie, Bottman and Mullick (2022) in secondary schools in Western Cape, South Africa, it was found that there were major gaps in knowledge about the causes and manifestations of CC among learners. An average of 37.1 per cent of the learners answered the questions for testing knowledge correctly. This indicated that few learners had knowledge about CC. In Zimbabwe, Ncube and Tawodzera (2019) found that 40 per cent of the learners in secondary schools did not know that CC was due to human activity. In another study in Zimbabwe by Kupika *et al*. (2019), it was found that learners in rural areas attributed CC to 'sin', 'a mystical phenomenon', 'spiritual forces' or to 'negative' cultural changes that have occurred in recent times. It is, therefore, necessary that CCE should be emphasised in schools so that learners develop new knowledge and change their attitudes on how they think about CC.

In terms of the practices, Larue, Jacques and Munang (2016) found that learners in ten secondary schools in Seychelles organised a project for rainwater harvesting as a means of adapting to water problems caused by CC. They also installed rainwater harvesting equipment, such as water tanks and roof gutters. In most cases, once learners have learned about CC, they often want to take action in response to what they have become concerned about. According to Anderson (2012), CCE offers an opportunity to act to reduce the impacts of CC. In Malawi, learners in schools are given a chance to take part in planting tree seedlings every year in January.

For instance, learners of Khongoloni Secondary School in Phalombe District planted more than 500 tree seedlings in the 2022/2023 rainy season. This is one of the practices aimed at mitigating CC. Sharm (2020) explained that learners in schools should be engaged in practices, such as planting tree seedlings and planting drought-tolerant crops in school gardens. Therefore, it is necessary that learners in secondary schools in Malawi become active in such practices to fight CC.

Results and Discussion

In this section, the results of the study are presented and discussed focusing on learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices about climate change education.

Learners' Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices towards Learning CCE Content

Questionnaires were distributed to 64 learners to find out their knowledge, attitudes and practices towards learning CCE content. Later, focus group discussions were also conducted with 8 groups of learners.

Knowledge

To find out the learners' knowledge about CCE, ten questions based on the learners' understanding of CC mitigation and adaptation, the different causes of CC, the different consequences of CC, ways of mitigating CC and ways of adapting to CC were provided in the questionnaire for learners to indicate their understanding. The results were as shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the correct responses for the questions are in bold sentences.

Table 1: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Learners' Knowledge about Climate Change Education

	Questions	Responses	f	%
1	What do you understand by the term climate change mitigation?	Human activities aimed at reducing vulnerability	36	56.2
		Human activities to prevent climate change from happening	5	7.8
		Activities that reduce the level and intensity of greenhouse gas emissions	17	26.6
		Natural and human adjustment to reduce vulnerability and take advantage of opportunities brought about by climate change	6	9.4
2	Which gas has seriously increased in concentration and is the main cause of greenhouse effect, which leads to climate change?	Methane (CH4)	4	6.3
		Carbon dioxide (CO2)	43	67.2
		Ozone (O3)	10	15.6
		Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)	7	10.9
3	What can be the main cause of the depletion of the ozone layer?	Pollution from land-fills	3	4.7
		Emissions of CFCs into the atmosphere	36	56.3
		The increasing temperature of sun's rays	14	21.8
		Burning of fossil fuel	11	17.2
4	Why are forests important for mitigating climate change?	Forests serve as a sink in the carbon cycle	22	34.4
		Trees provide building materials	37	57.8
		Trees are an important food source	2	3.1
		Leaves of trees reflect all sunlight away from the earth	3	4.7

5	Which of the following choices best represents a way to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions?	Drive more cars	3	4.7
		Burn more coal	1	1
		Cut down more trees	35	54.7
		Use solar energy	25	39.1
6	What do you know about climate change adaptation?	Human activities to prevent climate change from happening	9	14.1
		Human activities to reduce temperature rise on Earth	6	9.3
		Human activities to reduce the level and intensity of greenhouse gas emissions	36	56.3
		Human actions that reduce the negative impact of climate change, while taking advantage of potential new opportunities brought by climate change	13	20.3
7	Where does the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions caused by humans come from?	Industrial processes	42	65.6
		Electricity and heat	6	9.4
		Transportation.	9	14.1
		Buildings	7	10.9
8	Which of the following is not a way to adapt to climate change?	Build dams to protect shore line from flooding	3	4.7
		Plant different crops that can better stand a changing climate	6	9.4
		Reduce use of fossil fuels	18	28.1
		Wear light coloured clothes on hot days	37	57.8
9	What happens when global average temperature increases?	The average precipitation decreases	11	17.2
		The average precipitation increases	41	64.1
		The average precipitation remains unchanged	5	7.8
		Precipitation becomes unpredictable	7	10.9

From the results in Table 1, questions 1, 4 and 5 tested learners' knowledge about CC mitigation. In question 1, which focused on the understanding of the term climate change mitigation, only 26.6 per cent answered the question correctly. While in question 4, which required learners to indicate why forests are important for mitigating

climate change, only 34.4 per cent of the learners answered it correctly. In question 5, a question based on the way to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions, few learners (39.1%) responded correctly. On average, 33.4 per cent of the learners responded to questions on CC mitigation correctly. This meant that most learners had little knowledge about CC mitigation. There are also gaps in learners' knowledge of CC as indicated in the responses to the questions 2, 3 and 9.

The other set of questions, 6 and 8, were about CC adaptation. In question 6, where learners were required to indicate what they knew about CC adaptation, only 20.3 per cent responded correctly. In question 8, learners were required to single out a way that was not suitable for the adaptation to CC. In this question, only 28.1% answered correctly. This showed that an average of 24.2 per cent answered the questions on CC adaptation correctly. The implication is that most learners had scanty knowledge about CC adaptation. The picture is almost the same for the other set of questions as not more than half got the questions right.

As a way of triangulating the questions in the questionnaires, focus group discussions were done focusing on the same CC dimensions. The results were similar to what was found in questionnaires. Most learners gave wrong answers to questions that tested their knowledge about CC mitigation and adaptation. For instance, the learners were asked to distinguish between CC mitigation and CC adaptation. The following were some of the responses of learners in their focus groups:

In focus group 1 (FG1), one of the participants explained as follows:

> I think climate change mitigation is change of human behavior to reduce vulnerability and take advantage of opportunities by climate change, while climate change adaptation is when people do activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

In focus group 2 (FG2) it was agreed by the discussants that;

> Climate change mitigation is when more trees are planted to reduce the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, while climate change adaptation are activities that address the causes of climate change.

On the other hand, in focus group 4, an explanation was given by one of the participants to which the other members agreed that;

> I think in climate change mitigation, the focus is on addressing the causes of climate change, while in climate change adaptation the focus is on addressing the consequences of climate change.

Additionally, in focus group 8 (FG8) it was agreed by the group that;

> Climate change mitigation is change of human practices to reduce vulnerability to climate change, while climate change adaptation is when people do activities that reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

Out of the four responses, only FG4 gave the correct answer, while the other three responses in FG1, FG3 and FG8 gave the wrong answers. The results were not different from what Falaye and Okwilagwe (2016) found in secondary schools in Nigeria that learners' knowledge on CC mitigation and adaptation was low as most learners failed to distinguish between the two concepts. In this study, Falaye and Okwilagwe (2016) recommended that the curriculum should be revised to include CCE content that can assist in improving learners' knowledge on CC issues. The knowledge of CCE is significant for learners if they are to change their attitudes towards CC for the better.

Further, the results in Table 1 indicated that an average of 63 per cent of the learners responded to questions, 2, 3 and 7 in the category of the causes of CC correctly. This implied that most learners had good knowledge of the causes of CC. Additionally, an average of 66.5 per cent of the learners also answered questions 9 and 10 on the effects of CC correctly. This showed that the majority of learners had good knowledge about the effects of CC. The results for all the 10 questions in all the categories have shown that an average of 43.1 per cent of the learners responded to the questions correctly. This implied that more than half of the learners had little knowledge about CC. The results were similar to Kutywayo *et al.,* (2022) who found that an average of 37.1 per cent of the learners answered the questions on CC knowledge correctly, which pointed to the fact that few learners had knowledge about CC.

Similarly, Ncube and Tawodzera (2019) found that 40 per cent of the learners in secondary schools in Zimbabwe had little knowledge about CC. For instance, most learners did not know that CC was due to human activity. It is interesting, however, to note that learners in this study answered the questions (9 and 10) on the effects of CC correctly. This may be a result of what the learners in Malawi are experiencing regarding the effects of CC. This is a good starting point if the implementation of CCE is introduced in the Malawian curriculum since learners already experience the effects of CC. UNESCO (2020) recommended that CCE should be emphasised in schools in order to equip learners with knowledge as the future of the planet is in their hands. The acquisition of knowledge should lead to change in attitude. Thus, in this study, we also had to find out the learners' attitudes on this phenomenon.

Attitudes

As a way of measuring their attitudes about CCE, learners were asked to indicate on a three-point Likert scale what their views towards learning CCE content in senior

secondary school curriculum was. The questions focused on the learners' concerns for the future, readiness to act, readiness to make changes in the way of life and readiness to influence others in their community among others. The results are as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Learners' Attitudes Towards Learning CCE Content

Item	View	Agree		Not sure		Disagree		Total	
		f`	%	f`	%	f`	%	f`	%
1	Learning about climate change makes me get worried about the future	47	73.4	3	4.7	14	21.9	64	100
2	I am ready to learn Climate Change Education content though it frightens me	45	70.3	1	1.6	18	28.1	64	100
3	I am ready to influence people in my community to act in a way which diminishes global warming	42	65.6	2	3.1	20	31.3	64	100
4	After learning Climate Change Education content, I am now ready to change my way of life and adapt to climate change	45	64	1	1.6	22	34.4	64	100
5	I feel like learning Climate Change Education content is a waste of time because nature controls itself	18	28.1	4	6.3	42	65.6	64	100
6	We cannot stop cutting down trees because God gave an authority for man to control everything	22	34.4	2	3.1	40	62.5	64	100

The results in Table 2 indicate that most learners, 73.4 per centagreed that learning about CCE content made them get worried about the future. This was followed by 70.3 per cent of the learners who responded that they were ready to learn CCE content though it frightened them. Additionally, 65.6 per cent of the learners indicated that they were ready to influence people in their communities to act in ways, which can diminish global warming. On the other hand, 64 per cent of the learners indicated that after learning CCE content, they were ready to change their ways of life and adapt to CC. Further, 65.6 per cent of the learners disagreed that learning CCE content was a waste of time because nature controls itself. Finally, 62.5 per cent of the learners disagreed that they could not stop cutting down trees because God gave authority to man to control everything. Generally, the results indicated that although learners got worried about CC, the majority of them were willing to change their behaviours in favour of CC and were ready to take action to adapt and mitigate CC.

The results through questionnaires were not very different from what was found in focus group discussions with learners. When they were asked to explain how they felt about learning CCE content, learners responded that they got worried about their future. However, they said that they were ready to disseminate information about CC in their communities and were also ready to change their behaviours and take action by aiming at mitigating and adapting to CC. Table 3 shows some of the responses by learners in their groups.

Table 3: Learners Responses on How They Felt (attitudes) about Learning CCE Content

Item	Learners' responses about learning CCE content	Focus groups
1	*I become worried thinking that climate change may destroy my future (26)*	FG1; FG2; FG3; FG4; FG5; FG6; FG7; FG8.
2	*I feel frightened when I learn about the effects of climate change, for instance, loss of lives and properties (22)*	FG1; FG2; FG3; FG4; FG5; FG6; FG7; FG8.
3	*I am enthusiastic to change behaviour and take quick actions before climate change becomes worse (8)*	FG1; FG4; FG5; FG7; FG8.
4	*I am ready to disseminate information about climate change in my community (6)*	FG3; FG4; FG7; FG8.
5	*I appreciate that it is our responsibility to take care of the environment by planting more trees (5)*	FG1; FG5; FG6; FG8.

The results from focus group discussions in Table 3 have shown that 26 of the learners in all the focus group discussions expressed concern that they become worried when

learning about CCE content because of what they came to know about it. This is followed by 22 learners again in all the groups who also mentioned that they felt frightened when learning about the effects of CC due to loss of life and property. Further, 8 learners in 5 groups namely; FG1, FG4, FG5, FG7 and FG8 said that they become enthusiastic to take quick actions before CC becomes worse.

As indicated in both Tables 2 and 3, most learners got worried about the future when they learned about CC. Similar results were obtained by Kaplan and Guskin (2019) in the United States of America (USA) who found that 13 to 17 year-old learners got worried and expressed fear and anger around the scientific topic of CC. This finding is quite interesting and significant given that the finding is coming from two groups of young people who are in two different places and environments. According to Robertson and Barbosa (2015), learners educated in the USA got more of their information about CC from social media than from the classroom. Additionally, in studies by Seroussi *et al.*, (2019) in Israel, and Kutywayo *et al*., (2022) in South Africa, it was found that learners in secondary schools equally expressed worry about their future when learning about CCE content. Falaye and Okwilagwe (2016) suggested that teachers should choose better ways of teaching CCE content so that learners accept that they were in the most difficult time that needed to take quick actions. Kutywayo *et al.,* (2022) added that fear or worry cannot solve a problem but what was needed was to find solutions for local problems that related to CC. However, the worry and fear expressed by learners regarding CC is an indication that they understood the seriousness and consequences of CC and they could make good use of their education on the matter if they were supported.

It is for this reason that teachers need to use transformative approaches such as climate action in order to make learners develop even stronger and positive attitudes and become active in fighting CC rather than being worried about the results of CC without taking any action (UNESCO, 2021). Therefore, secondary school teachers in Malawi should work towards using best approaches to ensure that learners in secondary schools acquired appropriate and positive attitudes towards learning CCE content so that they can take appropriate and informed action in CC mitigation, adaptation and resilience.

Practices

In the questionnaire, learners were also asked to indicate the extent of their practices in the process of learning CCE content in senior secondary school curriculum. The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Learners Practices When learning CCE Content

Item	Practice	Agree		Not sure		Disagree		Total	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
1	We have a waste management project at our school	9	14.1	2	3.1	53	82.8	64	100
2	We plant drought tolerant crops in school garden	12	18.7	1	1.6	51	79.7	64	100
3	We harvest rainwater and use it for irrigation in the dry season	14	21.9	2	3.1	48	75	64	100
4	We create and paste posters with climate change messages	11	17.2	5	7.8	48	75	64	100
5	We have planted trees in the surrounding community	36	56.3	2	3.1	26	40.6	64	100
6	We have club activities aiming at mitigating climate change	22	34.3	1	1.6	41	64.1	64	100
7	We conduct awareness activities about climate change in the surrounding community	21	32.8	4	6.3	39	60.9	64	100
8	We always have a special day in a month for cleaning the environment	24	37.5	3	4.7	37	57.8	64	100

From the results in Table 4, the majority of the learners (82.8%) disagreed that they had a waste management project at their school. This is followed by 79.7 per cent of

learners who disagreed that they planted drought-tolerant crops in their school garden. Furthermore, 75 per cent of the learners disagreed that they harvested rainwater and used it for irrigation in the dry season. Additionallly, 75 per cent of the learners disagreed that they created and pasted posters with CC messages. However, 56.3 per cent agreed that they planted trees in the surrounding community but 64.1 per cent disagreed that they had club activities aiming at mitigating CC. About 60.9 per cent disagreed that they conducted awareness activities about CC in the surrounding community. Finally, 57.8 per cent of learners disagreed that they always had a special day in a month to clean the environment.

From the results, an average of 66.9 per cent of the learners did not have CCE practices for mitigating and adapting to CC. This is different from what Larue, Jacques and Munang (2016) found in ten secondary schools in Seychelles. According to Larue *et al.* (2016), three scholars in Seychelles reported that the learners organised a project for rainwater harvesting as a means of adapting to water problems caused by CC. They also installed rainwater harvesting equipment such as water tanks and roof gutters. In most cases, once learners have learned about CC, they often want to take action in response to what they have become concerned about. In South Africa, Thenga, Goldschagg, Ferguson and Mandikonza (2021) found that the Fundisa for Change programme assisted teachers to use transformative learning framework by engaging learners in practices for CC mitigation and adaptation. This could be a good model to try in Malawi since there seem to be very minimal practice orientation to CC.

According to UNESCO (2021), it is critical that CCE practices be embedded in the learning of CC. It should not just be learning CCE content in class, but it should be about understanding how everything they do is affected by CC and they must take immediate action to mitigate CC. According to Anderson (2012), CCE offers an opportunity to learners to act in order to reduce the impacts of CC. Sharm (2020) recommended teachers in schools to engage learners in practices such as waste management, water harvesting, planting tree seedlings and planting drought-tolerant crops in the school garden. The rainwater that learners can harvest may be used for the irrigation of crops in the school garden and for watering tree seedlings. Generally, there is a need to improve these CCE practices in secondary school curriculum in Malawi so that learners have best practices in solving CC problems.

Although an average of 66.9 per cent of the learners were not involved in CCE practices for mitigating and adapting to CC, 56.3 per cent of the learners agreed that they took part in planting trees in their communities. This is one of the good practices that learners are supposed to do as part of mitigating CC. Similarly, Bekele (2015) found that secondary school learners in Ethiopia had tree-planting projects, which yielded numerous sustainable benefits. It was observed that learners simulated the spirit of planting tree seedlings in their homes with the help of their parents, hence, creating a conscious generation towards conservation of forests and combating CC. Bekele (2015) further revealed that school clubs were influential in tree planting and sensitisation on tree plantations in schools and communities in Ethiopia. By engaging

learners in clubs, planting trees and exposing them to CCE lessons would go a long way in creating a CC-friendly society. A study in England revealed that, where learners are engaged in CCE-related lessons, it brings consciousness to environmental issues and protection (Turtle, Convery and Convery, 2015). The Malawi Institute of Education (2015) reported that in Malawi, both primary and secondary school learners are given a chance to take part in planting tree seedlings every year starting in December. This is good and must be encouraged in all schools so that learners are most likely transformed into active and responsible citizens in fighting CC.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this article, researchers examined learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices towards learning CCE content in senior secondary schools in Malawi. It can be concluded that the level of knowledge for learners in CCE is quite low as most learners failed to answer the questions on CC mitigation and adaptation correctly. In terms of attitudes, most learners get worried when learning about CCE content. However, it was found that most learners were ready to learn CCE content though it frightened them. We can, therefore, conclude that although learners have little knowledge of CC, they seem to have the right potential to develop desirable attitudes towards CC. It was also revealed that most learners were not involved in a variety of CCE practices for mitigating and adapting to CC such as water harvesting and waste management projects and others. We can, therefore, conclude that learners' practices were quite inadequate given the gravity of CC effects in Malawi that are so real and currently disrupting the normal social livelihoods. It is important to stress that the right CC practices are inevitable if learners in Malawi are to effectively be prepared as future leaders of the nation.

It can be recommended that to help improve learners' knowledge, attitudes and practices in CCE, there is a need for curriculum review so that it should have CCE content and practical activities in all the subjects. In other words, the school curriculum in Malawi should have many sustainable practical activities for mitigating and adapting to CC. For instance, learners should take part in activities such as waste management, planting tree seedlings, water harvesting and planting drought-resistant crops in school gardens. This can holistically transform the learners in terms of knowledge, attitudes and practices for combating CC. Learners should form clubs where they can share knowledge and organise CC projects.

Additionally, teachers should employ transformative approaches in the teaching of CCE content. This can enhance learners' knowledge and help them change attitudes and behaviours on how they interact with the environment. It should always be remembered that the future of the planet is in the hands of everyone and delaying to take action on CC may lead to disastrous consequences. But more importantly, the future of the planet is very much dependent on today's youths who now happen to be in school. Thus, the school curriculum should be tailored in such are way that it prepares

them for sustainable living in terms of management, mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

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