Achieving Green Behaviour in Zambia: Political Rhetoric, Hypocrisy and Duplicity versus Political Will

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Abstract

Achievement of sanitary and healthy environments in Zambia depends on several factors. The factors range from human behaviour to availability of infrastructure appropriate to garnering a clean and healthy environment. This paper will argue that people in government have a critical role to play in changing people's behaviour and providing infrastructure necessary for green waste management. Since 2007, the Zambian government has embarked on a programme to encourage people to live in clean, green and healthy communities. This campaign has, however, perceivably failed to yield the objectives for which it was crafted. The question that arises is whether political will has played its full role in the implementation of the programme or there have been aspects of political rhetoric, hypocrisy and duplicity. The paper looks at several discernment pointers to make conclusions about the subject matter. The findings are that, although political will is held as a crucial influence in the success of the campaign, there has not been enough political will in the implementation of the programme. Lack of political will to enforce statutes and provide necessary infrastructure have consigned the programme to partial success. The paper concludes that until political will replaces political rhetoric (mere persuasive speech), hypocrisy (lip service) and duplicity (deception), the keep Zambia clean, green and healthy programme is not likely to succeed.

Introduction

As indicated by the aphorism: 'cleanliness is next to godliness,' cleanliness is a good human virtue. It is related to hygiene and is part of medical routines essential for the prevention of diseases; it also has an aesthetic foundation in the human love of order and beauty and the exercise of such on the body (North, 2008). According to North, cleanliness also has a moral dimension in perceptions of purity, that of the body in harmony with the soul. Zambia is not oblivious of the benefits of clean living and has in the last twelve years (since 2007) been trying to implement an ambitious clean-up programme called the "Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign". The aim of the programme is to improve health standards throughout the country by ensuring that people maintained clean, green and healthy surroundings. The success of this programme depends on several factors including, *inter alia*, human attitudinal factors, institutional factors, and political will. Human attitudinal factors such as knowledge, values, beliefs and norms influence the behaviour of the citizens in relation to the environment (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Behaviour that minimises harm to the environment may be designated as green or pro-environmental behaviour (Steg &Vlek, 2009). More simply, green behaviour has been described as 'doing good and avoiding bad' (Cushman-Roisin, 2012). Science for Environment Policy (2012: 2) shows that green behaviour is the shared responsibility of all citizens in a country, whether as individual private citizens, public authorities or industry. Some examples of green behaviour include minimising energy use and reducing waste.

Institutional factors, on their part, include availability of infrastructure and organisational or management capacities (Gibson, McKean & Ostrom, 2000; Engel & Weber, 2007). In the context of waste management and green behaviour, infrastructure includes such paraphernalia as brooms for street sweeping, recycling facilities, incineration bays, waste bins, refuse collection trucks,

dumpsites, public transport and (clean) toilets. On the other hand, organisational or management capacities include leadership skills and professional knowledge in waste management. Researchers who have investigated these factors indicate that management deficiencies and lack of infrastructure in municipalities are key challenges in waste management (Mihalic, et al., 2004; Mrayyan & Handi, 2006; Guerrero et al., 2013). Moonga (2011) also observed that failure by the municipalities to fulfill their obligations concerning solid waste management are due to limited financial capacity and lack of trained manpower. When institutions are ill-equipped with both infrastructure and management capacities, they can hardly bring about change or social betterment (Engel & Weber, 2007), let alone green behaviour.

Political will as a determinant can be defined as the interests and intentions of local and national government decision-makers with respect to the implementation of the green behaviour programme (UN-Habitat (2010: 195). A perusal of literature shows that, although political will is a difficult term to define, it is a very strong influence on behaviour and is crucial in the execution of programmes, including programmes promoting environmentally friendly behaviour (CMI/U4, 2010). According to Kumar (2007), the political system prevailing in a country decides, promotes, fosters, encourages, shelters, directs and controls the countries environment. Politicians and those in leadership positions have power to influence others and make things happen (Dobel, 1998; Valle, 2006). They can also design and target policies that promote "greener" behaviour. This paper asserts that, of all the influences that affect the implementation of green programmes, political will is the biggest factor. Therefore, it is the intention of the paper to make an appraisal of how political will has influenced the implementation of the "Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign".

History of Green Behaviour in Zambia

Chastity and cleanliness have been the hallmark of the traditional way of life of indigenous people in Zambia since time immemorial.

There is evidence that indigenous communities encouraged living in clean and sanitary conditions even before precolonial times. Cleanliness, particularly washing, may originally have been for purification (or absolution) purposes (for example, after a birth or death, or for some religious purpose), but eventually became a response to cleaning (removal of physical dirty or ablution) and hygiene (Speltini & Passini, 2014). Local sayings, such as *akachila ka mbushi, kasenugla apokekele* (literally, a goats' tail sweeps or cleans where the goat is sitting) or *amafi banyela ukutali (*you cannot answer the call of nature – defecate - near where people are) show that there were informal lessons in hygiene in traditional societies in Zambia. Compliance was ensured by chiefs, who superintended over the affairs of their areas.

During the colonial period (Zambia then called Northern Rhodesia), village rules and regulations were established by the colonial government to govern the people. According to Tordoff (1979), these rules also included aspects concerned with hygienic practices where the local people were required to clean their domiciles at specific times. Households were also required to have a pit latrine and a waste pit. This was a new dimension to how indigenous people dealt with dirt. It was generally received with dissention and resentment as it was considered alien and the methods used coercive. During this period, district commissioners ensured that people kept to the prescribed standards of cleanliness and hygiene.

After independence, the new nationalist government of Kenneth Kaunda was keen to have a clean country for a healthy nation. The government, therefore, tried to find new ways of keeping the country clean (Banda, 2013: 2). To this effect, the government provided waste bins and reliable transport for waste disposal. However, the contraction in Zambia's economy which happened in the 1970s did not spare the waste management sector in the country. During this period, there was a sharp increase in oil prices (Zambia's main import) and a plunge in copper prices (the country's main export) on the world market. The resultant economic recession meant that

financing to the waste management sector slackened and government could no longer provide adequate waste management infrastructure and facilities.

The populist government that came after the second republic further abandoned the good hygiene and waste management practices of the first and second republics. There was laxity both in the provision of waste management services and in the enforcement of regulations related to waste management; with impunity, people traded on the streets without any facilities such as waste bins and toilets (and the republican president even appointed a junior minister to be in charge of street vending). At a personal level, the wellbeing of Zambians was being affected by dirty and unsanitary environments (Chileshe & Moonga, 2017, 2019). At national level, the country was effectively ushered into a period of increased waste production, a situation which its waste management institutions and infrastructure could hardly cope with. The enabling environment spiraled out of control and Zambians started to suffer at the hands of preventable diseases such as cholera.

When the Mwanawasa government succeeded the government of Chiluba in 2001, the waste management situation continued to be desperate (Banda, 2013). In order to change the status quo, President Mwanawasa declared the "Keep Zambia Clean and Healthy (KZCH) Campaign" and launched it on 22nd June 2007. The campaign was backed by Statutory Instrument (SI) No. 100 of 2007 which compelled individuals and institutions to take responsibility of the waste they produced (GRZ, 2017). To kick start the programme, government also provided funding to a tune of K200 million at the time. However, the KZCH programme which was seen as the panacea to the problem of dirty and unhealthy surroundings did not achieve what it was intended to (Chileshe, 2018). As early as 2008, Harvey and Mukosha (2008) noted that the implementation of the programme was both fragile and flimsy as there was little or no indication on the ground to show its effectiveness and impact, especially after the demise of President Mwanawasa in that year.

Since 2008, the country has remained largely unclean, despite a few notable achievements scored by the government. Banda (2013: 3) contends that "efforts to rejuvenate [the programme] have been made [the programme was relaunched on 4ᵗʰ October, 2015 and again on 28ᵗʰApril, 2018 by President Lungu] but have remained abstract ideas as the people did not seem to get involved while other government officials were also making statements without concrete action and systematic approach." When the programme was relaunched the second time, a component of greening was added to now read as "the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign."

Political Rhetoric, Hypocrisy, Duplicity and Political Will

Mihalic (2004) puts it that a sound programme will not produce the desired results if it is poorly implemented. According to Banda (2013), the impediments to the proper implementation of the KZCH programme are two-fold: firstly, members of the general public do not seem to get involved (human attitudinal factor) and secondly, *some* government officials are portraying symptoms of hypocrisy and duplicity (that is, making statements without following them up with concrete action). This assertion by Banda creates impetus for our discussion. Bryant (1996: 341) argues that the implementation of sustainable development policies is an intensely and inevitably political process. Therefore, it is important to consider whether government policy initiatives are meant for real change (that is, there is political will) or are merely political rhetoric designed to maintain the status quo or for political expediency.

Because of the power they wield, governments all over the world have the ability to influence or control the behaviour of people. As such, governments can provide a policy framework within which businesses and citizens can operate with less detriment to the environment (Science for Environment Policy (2012: 2). The problem is that politicians face a perpetual conflict between what is expedient at the moment and what they should do for the long-term.

There is also pressure between the politician's personal integrity and pressure from organisations that support their privileged position. Unfortunately, it is usually expediency, narrow interests and myopic views that prevail at the expense of longer-term consequences. The problem is that political expediency is not democracy; if anything, it is a big threat to democracy and socio-economic development since it is usually the voice of the vocal minority that prevails (McCullough, 2017).

Ross (December 7, 2015) defines political rhetoric as the attempt to apply fundamental principles to the circumstances a particular people face at the moment. According to Ross, political rhetoric is effective at both mobilising immediate popular political support and making an enduring impact on our self-understanding. Therefore, politicians will use rhetoric to appeal to the masses, almost impetuously, even if they will not follow through on their pronouncements. In discussing how proclamations made by government leaders usually depart from their actions, we will explain the terms hypocrisy and political will. When political leaders say one thing and then do the other, or they portray startling inconsistencies between behaviour and character, it is called hypocrisy (Ruciman, 2008). Hypocrisy is often shrouded in duplicity or deceit. It is explained as the inner motives of political actors – not being on the inside what they appear to be on the outside – pretending to be abiding to the outward demands of people even when they have no intention of doing so. According to Ruciman, hypocrisy is problematic; although it is inherently unattractive, it is also more or less inevitable and in most political settings it is practically ubiquitous. No one likes it, but everyone is at it, which means that it is difficult to criticise hypocrisy without falling into the trap of exemplifying the very thing one is criticising (Ruciman, 2008: 1). But people mind about hypocrisy, because it is detestable, repulsive and no one enjoys being played a fool.

Apart from hypocrisy, political leaders may also get entangled in vacillation and irresoluteness because they either lack political will or capacity. Malena (2009) defines capacity as political 'can',

that is, we are 'willing' to buy the waste bins and garbage collection trucks but we don't have sufficient funds to procure them (lack of capacity). Or we know that we need the bins and trucks but they are not our priority at the moment (low prioritisation). People often cite lack of political will as the culprit for poorly performing and failing programmes. For example, UNEP (2013: 12) states that "lack of political will makes waste management among the most significant planning challenges faced by developing and transition economy countries in the 21ˢᵗ century." A case in point is a study by Molapo et al. (2014) of waste management among secondary school pupils in Maseru (Lesotho); 23.3 % of the participants in this study cited lack of facilities, particularly waste bins with lids, as the reason why there was rampant littering in the city. Similarly, 58 % of the participants in Chileshe's (2018) study named lack of facilities as a main reason for the sloppy implementation of the KZCH programme. Earlier studies (Mrayyan & Hamdi, 2006; Bogner et al.*,* 2007; Sharholy et al.*,* 2007; Moonga, 2011; Durand, 2013) have also shown that lack of resources and facilities can be explained in terms of capacity and will.

It should be noted, however, that the indicators for political will and the lack of it are intricate and intertwined. For example, failure to procure waste bins and trucks can result from a variety of factors beyond simply insufficient motivation or low prioritisation (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). For example, low prioritisation can be a result of low levels of capacity. This lack of capacity has, unfortunately, been misconstrued to mean lack of political will and even hypocrisy. In developing countries like Zambia, it is difficult to draw a line between lack of political will, hypocrisy and lack of capacity. As indicated by UNEP (2013: 12), these countries incessantly lack institutional capacity and are bedeviled by perennial financial constraints. In such a scenario, it is difficult for governments to ensure political will or exercise morality. To this effect, Dobel (1998: 79) explains that, "to the extent that all moral action is underdetermined and takes place in a world of limited resources and constraints set by circumstances, all

morality is imperfect." Consequently, we may not expect morality alone to sustain a full political ethics. However, as the old adage would have it, 'where there is a [political] will, there is a way'. The enormous task that politicians have is to build both material capacity and political will.

It is also difficult to distinguish between will (willing and unwilling), expediency and capacity (able and unable) (CMI/U4, 2010). For example, is it political will if politicians build a road in a particular area, or is it for the enhancement of their influence and reputation? CMI/U4 (2010) argues that if a politician believes that constructive reform (and even destructive reform) serves self-serving purposes, he or she is likely to pursue it. On the contrary, if reform appears not to serve those ends, the politician will do little or nothing to pursue it. Bryant (1996: 342) explains that "literature shows that politicians embrace the concept of sustainable development in the belief that such a strategy holds important political benefits, rather than as a result of concern about environmental degradation per se." Therefore, if political will is to work for the success of environmental programmes, politicians should direct their energies at serving people and the natural environment (that is, hold self-transcendent values) instead of pursuing narrow, self-serving interests. Unfortunately, what is often seen is political expedience at the expense of people and the environment. Cabinet Office (n.d.) asserts that politicians (and other leaders) should lead by example by simply changing their own behaviour. This is important because actions of high-profile leaders send implicit messages about the behaviours government condones. Therefore, it is not about the 'do as I say, not as I do' hypocrisy.

Examples of Political Will

As indicated earlier, government cannot avoid affecting how people behave in society (Sunstein, 1995). This is because government leaders are decision-makers and are also at the helm of resource

mobilisation for programmes. Through these actions they can influence what happens and what does not happen. What matters then is where they direct their political will and energy. Countries where political leaders have demonstrated genuine political will have made tremendous strides in implementing clean and green programmes. Government could use education, persuasion, tax, subsidy, fines, or impose time, place and manner restrictions to ensure green behaviour. It could also simply use force or straightforward coercion. The principle of consequentialism states that the end result justifies the means (that is, whether actions are morally right or wrong depends on their effects). Sonigo et al. (2012) cited in Science for Environmental Policy (2012) have identified four main categories of policy tool that can be used to encourage green behaviour. These are:

- Regulatory – such as mandatory tools that ban or limit certain products or behaviour, and requirements, such as mandatory sweeping and possession of waste bins.
- Economic – market-based instruments that influence purchasing decisions through taxes, incentives, subsidies, penalties or grants for green enterprises.
- Information – such as effects of poor waste disposal on the environment and human health.
- Behavioural – tools or nudges aimed at influencing consumer behaviour by leading individuals to make choices that are better for the environment.

Whichever approach government chooses to undertake, political will is infinitely essential. Successful stories of cleanliness, such as those of Calgary (Canada), Rwanda and Singapore, report robust awareness programmes coupled with imposition of heavy fines on residents and supported by unbridled political will. About Rwanda, for example, Hitimana (December 3, 2018, para. 5) states that:

> the enabling environment is here because there
> is a high level of commitment by the government to

develop and create a climate-resilient economy. Let's take for example when you drive to the City of Kigali, you can see that the road infrastructures, pedestrian walkways and bicycle lanes are being integrated more and more.

The Zambian Scenario

In Zambia, the dirty surroundings are inexorably linked to the fact that many Zambians are now employed in the informal sector where their workplace is the street. Chileshe and Moonga (2017) alluded to the fact that lack of employment and high poverty levels in Zambian cities have driven some residents to the limit. In the absence of formal employment, residents have resorted to different ways of earning a livelihood in the informal sector. Within the inner city, residents engage themselves in activities such as street vending, stone crushing, and doing other odd jobs in a quest for survival. This group of informal sector workers has incessantly become a strong and influential voice in the country because it is perceived to constitute the majority of voters. As stipulated earlier, politicians have to choose between their personal integrity and pressure from organisations that support their privileged positions; in Zambia, street vendors constitute such an organisation.

There is little or no doubt that the Zambian government is politically committed to making the country clean and green when one looks at the laws, regulations, statutory instruments and committees that it creates to oversee the implementation of the green behaviour programme. One of the laws that the government enacted recently is Statutory Instrument No. 10 of 2018 which expressly prohibits, among other nuisances, vending and car washing on the streets. Nevertheless, this commitment sits uneasily with regard to other 'equally pertinent commitments' by the government, such as providing employment to thousands of Zambians who cannot find jobs in the formal sector, but who are also perceived to be the voters. Most politicians, both in the ruling and opposition parties, take the

path of least resistance and may often play to the gallery concerning issues of green behaviour (Miller, 2000). Politicians know that voters are more likely to favour a candidate who loudly says "I will allow street vending to continue when I'm voted into office."

The government is, therefore, caught at the crossroads of trying to meet both the environmental objectives and political expediency. This reflects the personal, political and economic interests of the political leadership in the country and is the genesis of the hypocrisy and duplicity that they manifest. Ostensibly, the technocrats who are supposed to implement the policy are often caught in between these essentially contradictory pronouncements. Most often, they fail to rise above this spiteful political acrimony and rancor and join the bandwagon for the sole purpose of saving their jobs. Ntambo (2013) states that some political leaders use their authority for personal reasons or to disrupt processes that should be the responsibility of technocrats. Sometimes contradictory positions over policy directions have even occurred among the politicians themselves. Ministers have found themselves transferred from one ministry to another for trying to implement policy in a particular way. This is clearly expressed in the following statement:

> It is not clear why the president has demoted minister Y, but sources say it is because of Y's uncompromising stand in wanting to remove the street vendors that has angered State House who are [*sic*] opposed to moves to clean the streets (*Zambian Watchdog,* July 26, 2012).

Ambiguities such as those deriving from changing positions by leaders can also bring about uncertainty in the execution of work among junior officers. Mihalic et al. (2004) state that *administrative apathy* or a lack of administrative support to implementing staff tends to make them lose motivation and interest in the programme. The consequence of this state of affairs would most certainly be programme failure.

Trust in government is a major factor in the importance that people attach to environmental programmes. It has been identified as "one of the most important foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built. [It] is essential for social cohesion and well-being as it affects governments' ability to govern and enables them to act without having to resort to coercion" (OECD, 2013: 21). According to Easton (1965), trust in government represents confidence of citizens in the actions of a "government to do what is right and perceived fair." Therefore, hypocrisy stemming from the high echelons of power has the negative effect that people may lose confidence and trust in their leaders and government institutions spearheading developmental programmes (Blake, 1999). Mirfin (n.d.) explains that the problem is that people increasingly distrust the political system that hypocritical leaders are part of. They feel political hypocrisy has become so rife that it is hard to find an example of genuine and really sincere politicians than it is the obverse. When distrust happens, members of the general public may lose interest in a programme. This can, in turn, lead to lower rates of compliance with rules and regulations (OECD, 2013). Moghadam et al. (2009) call this *societal apathy* (or, simply, 'I don't care' attitude). This resistance is evident in the following statements made by residents of Lusaka when government announced garbage collection fees:

> I am sure Lusaka residents will gladly pay high fees for this exercise if they know and actually see that their money is giving them clean surroundings in return (*Lusaka Times*, February 4, 2014).
>
> It's not like we are really seeing the value of paying the money anyway. The drains are clogged; the turn offs have bushes growing which makes driving dangerous. No pedestrian crossings on any new roads or even speed humps to slow drivers down where kids pass [cross] from schools, street lights not even

working, no public toilets and even if there are, hardly ever maintained. If the people saw value out of their payments, maybe then they would be willing to pay (*Lusaka Times*, January 21, 2014).

It is my fervent prayer that political expediency will not undermine this noble endeavour. It is imperative that all are in support regardless. Hygiene and sanitation are the bedrock of health, growth and prosperity (Chilombo, 2018).

Conversely, trust in government could improve compliance with rules and regulations and reduce the cost of enforcement (OECD, 2013: 22). OECD (2014) explains that ensuring effective compliance is an important factor in creating a well-functioning society and trust in government. It is a key element in safeguarding health and safety, protecting the environment, securing stable state revenue and delivering other essential public goals. The statements above from residents of Lusaka show that people are willing to do a lot for the environment; they are willing to go green and to pay more for environmentally-friendly choices. However, people also seek consistency in the pronouncements and actions of their leaders. Therefore, when there are contradictory messages coming from the leadership, people may resist to change their behaviour (a phenomenon called *inertia*) or choose the easiest option (*the path of least resistance*). Dobel (1998: 76) asserts that leaders have special obligations to understand the level of trustworthiness as well as the intentions and capacities of people.

Another dimension to hypocrisy is that, since it is everywhere, it is tempting for politicians from the opposition to seek to expose the inevitable double standards of their rivals in government in the pursuit of power and votes (Ruciman, 2008: 2-3). This thread has become the characteristic way of doing politics in Zambia; politicians throwing mud at opponents when they catch them practising hypocrisy. Lekalake (2017) argues that opposition parties might put

off potential voters if they are seen to be constantly criticising the ruling party rather than contributing to the country's development. While this is true, it is equally true that the opposition can easily lay all the blame for the country's problems on government hypocrisy and issue predictions of impending failure and doom, all the while carrying on a consistent, organised campaign to oust the government at every stage (Schroeder, 2016).

An additional danger of hypocrisy is that, when the vocal minority influences policy on behalf of the silent majority as is happening now in Zambia, some kind of dissonance may occur. Berkowitz (2013) explains that norms could be misrepresented by social groups, either through pluralistic ignorance or through false consensus. *Pluralistic ignorance* happens when the majority thinks that it is a minority, that is, the "plurality" is ignorant of itself. On the other hand, false *consensus* takes place when the minority incorrectly thinks that it is in the majority, that is, when a "consensus" is falsely perceived. These two scenarios do not auger well with policy-making because, as research by behavioural scientists has shown, individuals tend to prefer to go with the majority. If the majority, therefore, thinks it is in the minority, it is the values of the minority that are ascribed as norms. The vocal minority influences policy on behalf of the silent majority (Mustafaraj et al., 2011). In Zambia, the consequence of this dissonance is that many actions which ordinarily would constitute illegalities are increasingly becoming acceptable by members of the general public. In relation to waste management, some illegalities include open dumping of waste, littering, open defecation and urination, burning garbage within the backyard, washing cars on the streets and vending on the streets.

Moving forward

From the foregoing, it can be stated that government's commitment to implementing the green behaviour campaign has not been strong enough to produce a real impact. The absence of rigorous political will

has meant offenders, such as litterers, have gone away unpunished and necessary waste management infrastructure has not been provided. There is, therefore, need for an invigorated government effort to implement the green behaviour campaign. This effort should be devoid of traces of hypocrisy and duplicity and should not be rallied by political rhetoric. It should rather be exemplified by stringent (and sometimes coercive) environmental clean-ups, such as those used by the success stories of Calgary, Rwanda and Singapore. Previous regimes have used coercion to wad vendors off the streets but enforcement of such efforts has been either episodic or sporadic rather than continuous. The clean-up drives in Rwanda and Singapore may have to be epitomised by Zambia if substantial progress is going to be mustered in the area of cleanliness in the country. One social media commenter calls for "tough measures to be put in place to curb the problem [of littering] in Zambia as a whole!" (Lusaka *Times*, January 29, 2013). This can be taken to mean that the commenter is advocating for coercion. Dobel (1998) asserts that coercion looms as the most dangerous means of bringing about behaviour change but also notes that all prudent political achievement should breed accomplishments that endure and gain legitimacy with an economical use of coercion. He further explains that coercion is often necessary to define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The threat of coercion is often crucial to give others the incentive to comply with an outcome. At other times, government coercion can deter, defend, and set boundaries on regime behaviour and protect individuals from exploitation.

As indicated earlier on, the "Keep Zambia Clean Green and Health Campaign" is supported by statutory instruments which have been promulgated by government. However, enacting rules and regulations is just one prong in a bi-prolonged process; rules and regulations also need to be enforced (World Bank Group, 2002). Government as an authority figure does not only need to enactment laws but also has the responsibility to ensure that people who

violate them are held accountable. In enforcing the laws concerning green behaviour (or indeed any other laws), government should not give mixed messages about whether certain types of behaviour are encouraged or not; it should not matter who has infringed the law. People should see consistency in the way government and its representatives enforce rules and regulations. Some of the dissent among Zambians today derives from the differential application of laws by government officials among different groups of people, treating some groups as sacred cows, as is evident in the following statements:

> In Zambia, it's just that [political party X] is scared of losing elections for doing the right thing and prevent disease (*Lusaka Times*, July 14, 2015).

> Blame X [then Republican President] for the filthy city [Lusaka]. You still call him man of action, my foot. Remove street vending, enforce civic laws and don't use street vending for political votes and you will have a clean city (*Lusaka Times*, January 22, 2014).

> Strict enforcement of the instruments unlike the usual lackluster approach we see that has rendered many well-meaning laws toothless.

> There should be unwavering political will that transcends political patronage; *no sacred cows please* (Lusaka Times, January, 2013).

Barack Obama, the former president of the United States is quoted to have said inconsistency in the implementation of rules can bring about instability and strife. "The law is the law and no-one person is [above] the law, not even the president" (Laing, July 28, 2015). In order for political leaders to respect laws, they must have the virtue ethics of honesty and morality. According to Dobel (1998), virtues do not replace laws, norms, or duties in political life, but they give life to these moral imperatives. Furthermore, a leader's virtues

and the personal capacity to live up to promises, obey the law, and follow directives depend upon the primary moral capacity of self-mastery (Smith, 1976). Staples (2016) states that self-worth that is not backed by self-mastery or control becomes narcissism.

The political will of those in government is also expected to put into place mechanisms which make it easier for people to practice green behaviour. For example, it is a well-known fact that poverty and environmental degradation flow in tandem (Chileshe & Moonga, 2017, 2019). Mink (1993: 1) states that "a lack of resources makes it difficult for the poor to buy out of exposure to environmental risks, or to invest in alleviating the causes of environmental degradation." When people are poor, they have 'short horizons.' Their preoccupation is looking for food, not clean and sanitary surroundings. They do not spend their meagre incomes on acquiring waste bins; rather, they spend the money on procuring food, shelter and clothing. In his appropriately titled article *Empty talk or call to action?* Burg (2003) suggests that the problem of waste management in a country could be dealt with by also dealing with the problem of poverty. Therefore, alleviating poverty could put into place green behaviour since there is an overlap between poverty alleviation and reduced environmental stresses. Similarly, green behaviour also requires waste management infrastructure. This is essential because people will not stop littering if there are no waste bins; they will not walk or cycle to work if it is not safe to do so; they will not stop buying bottled water if tap water tastes bad.

Lastly, political leaders need to be prudent. Dobel (1998: 74) argues that, from the time of Aristotle, theorists have argued that of all the virtues, prudence (or practical wisdom) represents the linchpin of political judgment and that any theory of leadership needs to develop an account of prudence. Dobel further argues that:

> …political prudence is a central moral resource for political leaders and that there are normative responsibilities and obligations that flow from it.

>Persons in positions of leadership make a difference;
>they can bring about changes in behaviour that
>would not occur without their presence and actions
>… For these, and other reasons, leaders need to be
>prudent (p.74).

Prudence accounts for the superior ability for political leaders to see what is good not only for themselves but also for mankind (Moskop, 1996). Therefore, it is expected that political leaders in Zambia will display high levels of prudence as they administer the affairs of the nation. This prudence includes how they inculcate elements of green behaviour in the Zambian citizenry.

Conclusion

Although behaviour is influenced by many factors (Jackson, 2005), political will has a role to play in supporting and encouraging green behaviour. This paper has established that political will is one of the strongest factors that could bring about environmental behaviour change and support the green behaviour programme being implemented in Zambia. Since political will rests in the hands of government and the ruling political parties, these should show commitment to address these issues in order to produce a real impact. The paper has also emphasised the contradictory and hypocritical nature of political will in the country in the implementation of the campaign for a clean, green, and healthy behaviour. On one hand, the government appears to be committed to the campaign; it has pumped millions of kwacha into the programme, introduced new statutory instruments, and formed steering committees. On the other hand, the government does not appear committed to providing the infrastructure necessary for green waste management and is perceived to be allowing street vending which is one of the most important sources of most of the littering in the country. While lack of infrastructure may be attributed to lack of capacity on the part of government, the allowing street vending may be attributed to sheer political expediency, hypocrisy or duplicity. The accommodative

strategies towards the environment shown by government may not yield the desired environmental behaviour and conditions any time soon. The paper, therefore, recommends a more rigorous approach to the campaign comparable to those approaches adopted by the Calgarian, Rwandese and Singaporean authorities.

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